Adjust Me if I Can’t: The Effect of Firm Incentives on Labor Supply Responses to Taxes by Tazhitdinova, Alisa
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Adjust Me if I Can’t: The Effect of Firm
Incentives on Labor Supply Responses to
Taxes
Alisa Tazhitdinova
McMaster University
2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/81611/
MPRA Paper No. 81611, posted 28 September 2017 14:28 UTC
Adjust Me if I Can’t: The Effect of Firm
Incentives on Labor Supply Responses to Taxes
Alisa Tazhitdinova∗
Abstract
I provide theoretical and empirical evidence on the importance of statu-
tory incidence in labor markets in the presence of asymmetric frictions.
Using a theoretical model I show that labor supply responses are stronger
when the statutory incidence of taxes or labor rules falls on firms, even
when wages can adjust freely. I explore these mechanisms by studying
labor responses to incentives generated by the “Mini-Job” program aimed
at increasing labor supply of low-income individuals in Germany. Using
administrative data, I show evidence of a strong behavioral response – in
the form of sharp bunching – to the mini-job threshold that generates large
discontinuous changes both in the marginal tax rates and in the total in-
come and payroll tax liability of individuals in Germany. Sharp bunching
translates into elasticity estimates that are an order of magnitude larger
than has been previously estimated using the bunching approach. To ex-
plain the magnitude of the observed response, I show that in addition to
tax rates, fringe benefit payments also change at the threshold. Mini-job
workers receive smaller yearly bonuses and fewer vacation days but are
paid higher gross wages than regular workers. These results indicate that
lower fringe benefits make mini-jobs attractive to employers, thus facilitat-
ing labor supply responses in accordance with the model’s predictions.
JEL Classification: H20, H22, H24, H31, H32, J22, J23, J32, J38
Keywords: Payroll Tax, Income Tax, Earnings Elasticity, Incidence, Fringe
Benefits
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The public finance literature has largely ignored the role of firms and firms’
incentives when evaluating labor supply responses to tax policies. Under stan-
dard neoclassical assumptions and in presence of perfectly elastic labor demand,
workers are paid their marginal products, leading to full passthrough of income
and social security taxes to employees regardless of the statutory incidence of
taxes. This incidence result effectively eliminates firms’ involvement in the deter-
mination of equilibrium quantities of labor supplied and wages paid. However,
this simple framework does not take into account the intrinsic differences between
employers and employees: workers are more likely to suffer from search costs, in-
formation frictions and behavioral biases than firms. Firms therefore have the
ability to either exacerbate these biases by taking advantage of individuals,1 or
on the opposite, mitigate frictions, e.g. by informing workers.2
In this paper I challenge the traditional view that the statutory incidence of
taxes and other labor rules is irrelevant in labor markets. Instead, I argue that
in the presence of asymmetric frictions, statutory incidence matters through its
effect on firm incentives, even if wages can adjust freely. Taxes, which statutory
incidence falls on firms, generate immediate incentives to hire workers of the
tax-advantaged type. If firms are unconstrained, these incentives allow firms to
act as a conduit to workers’ preferences, facilitating labor supply responses. On
the other hand, taxes, which statutory incidence falls on workers, do not distort
relative wages and therefore do not affect firm incentives, leaving it up to workers
to find desired jobs. If individuals experience large search costs, the adjustment
process is slow and the labor supply responses are weak.
I provide empirical evidence on the importance of statutory incidence by
studying tax incentives generated by the “Mini-Job” program aimed at increasing
labor supply of low-income individuals in Germany. Mini-jobs are defined as
employments in which earnings do not exceed a predetermined monthly threshold.
Mini-job earnings are exempt from income and employee-paid social security
taxes, generating large discontinuous changes both in the total tax liability (a
notch) and in the marginal tax rates of individuals (a kink) at the threshold.
1It has been shown in many settings that firms take advantage of customer bias, see
Akerlof and Shiller (2015).
2Best (2014) shows that workers in Pakistan improve their knowledge of the tax schedule
from firms’ wage offers, which make them more responsive to income taxation.
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Despite the low value of the mini-job threshold - which ranged between e325 to
e450 since 1999 – approximately 7.3 million individuals, or 18% of the labor force,
hold mini-jobs.3 Using administrative data on labor histories of a 2% sample of
the German population, I find sharp bunching at the mini-job threshold that is
persistent over time and across demographic groups, and follows the threshold
precisely.
To estimate the magnitude of the behavioral response, I extend the method-
ological approaches of Saez (2010) and Kleven and Waseem (2013) to frameworks
with large discontinuous marginal and average tax rate changes. The approach
separately accounts for the bunching due to a kink and due to a notch, thus gen-
erating an unbiased estimate of the earnings elasticity. Elasticity point estimates
range from 0.08 to 0.18 for women and from 0.07 to 0.37 for men, depending on
the year. Calculated elasticities are 5 to 10 times larger than has been previously
estimated using the bunching method and are more in line with studies in the
labor supply literature (Kleven (2016), Keane (2011)).
The large estimated elasticities raise concerns that the observed responses
might not truly reflect individuals’ preferences. I argue that this is indeed true:
I document larger elasticities among individuals with weaker financial incentives
or no incentives to bunch at all. To explain the large bunching, I focus on
firm incentives. Using firm and household surveys that provide information on
working hours and earnings of employees, I explore whether differences in fringe
benefits or working hours arrangements make mini-jobs attractive to firms. I
find that mini-job workers receive smaller yearly bonuses and fewer vacation
days but are paid approximately 6% higher gross wages than regular part-time
workers.4 These results suggest that higher gross wages paid to mini-job workers
compensate for the lower fringe benefit payments they receive. Next, I rule out
the second channel (flexibility of hours) by showing that mini-job workers have
similar employment durations as regular part-time workers.
The findings indicate that in addition to employee-paid taxes, fringe benefits,
whose statutory incidence falls on firms, also change at the threshold. To better
3The number of mini-jobs increased from about 4 million in 1999 to over 7 million by 2010.
Source: Federal Employment Agency.
4This finding rules out the possibility that the tax break given to employees is shared between
workers and firms through lower wages paid to mini-job workers.
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understand how such firm incentives may affect labor supply responses, I develop
a partial equilibrium tax incidence model with job search costs and endogenous
hour constraints. The main assumption of the model is that workers experience
stronger frictions than firms and therefore are willing to accept jobs with less-
than-ideal hours. When the statutory incidence of taxes falls on individuals,
wages and firm incentives are unaffected, and the magnitude of labor supply
response thus decreases as individuals’ search costs increase. On the other hand,
when the statutory incidence of taxes falls on firms, wages and firm incentives
change. Because firms do not experience search costs, they have an incentive and
ability to hire tax-advantaged workers until wages adjust and labor costs equalize.
The theoretical model thus predicts that in the presence of asymmetric frictions,
labor supply responses are stronger if the statutory incidence of taxes or other
labor costs falls on firms rather than workers. The model’s predictions explain
the large magnitude of observed response to the mini-job threshold: because the
statutory incidence of fringe benefits falls on firms, differences in fringe benefit
rates make mini-jobs attractive to employers, making these jobs readily available.
The results of this study are policy relevant for two reasons. First, under-
standing the seeming popularity of mini-jobs is important because similar types
of policies have been proposed in other countries.5 It has been further argued that
the flexibility of the German labor market system, and the existence of mini-jobs
in particular, are the reasons why Germany faired better in the Great Reces-
sion than other countries (Burda and Hunt (2011)). Second, since the statutory
incidence of taxes is relatively easy to change, the results suggest that statu-
tory incidence can be used as a policy tool and the choice of statutory incidence
should depend on the outcomes the government is trying to achieve. To reduce
distortions, taxes and rules should apply to workers. On the other hand, if the
government wishes to stimulate job creation, giving incentives directly to firms
might lead to faster employment, by generating immediate incentives to hire
workers, instead of relying on workers’ ability to find suitable jobs.
This paper contributes to several literatures. An emerging literature in public
finance shows that the economic incidence of taxes and the tax revenue collected
may vary with the statutory incidence and remittance mechanism if the abil-
5Specifically, in Spain and in the UK.
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ity to evade or avoid taxes varies across economic agents (Slemrod (2008) and
Kopczuk et al. (2016)), or if the salience of taxes depends on the statutory in-
cidence (Chetty et al. (2009)). This paper is the first to document and explain
the mechanism through which the statutory incidence of labor costs can affect
the magnitude of labor supply responses to taxes in the presence of frictions.
The results demonstrate that adjustment frictions and search costs (Chetty et al.
(2011), Kleven and Waseem (2013), Gelber et al. (2013)), as well as information
frictions (Chetty and Saez (2013)) could be partially mitigated by firm responses.
This paper also contributes to a small literature that studies the role of firms
in workers’ earnings responses to taxes (Pencavel (2016)). Chetty et al. (2011)
and Best (2014) show that firms help workers respond to taxes by tailoring the
distribution of hours offered to workers’ preferences. Haywood and Neumann
(2017) estimate an equilibrium job search model featuring aggregate responses,
confirming suggestive evidence. Finally, Gudgeon and Trenkle (2017) examine
the nature of adjustment costs facing mini-job workers following the 2003 and
2013 reforms, and show that firm labor demand plays a key role in determining
the magnitude of adjustment costs in the short-run. This paper argues that firms
are more likely to tailor offers, and hence the distortions generated by tax notches
and kinks are stronger, when the statutory incidence of taxes falls on employers,
even in circumstances where wages can adjust freely.
This study also closely relates to the vast literature that estimates how mea-
sures of labor supply respond to changes in tax rates. While the approach taken
in this work is closest to studies that estimate elasticity of taxable income (e.g.
Saez (2010), Chetty et al. (2011), and Kleven and Waseem (2013)), I estimate an
elasticity of wage earnings which can be directly compared to other labor studies
that measure changes in hours (see Keane (2011) for a review). This paper makes
a methodological contribution by showing how the elasticity of earnings can be
estimated in the presence of large kinks and notches.6,7
6Further, this study also contributes to a smaller literature that estimates responses to pay-
roll taxes specifically (Gruber (1997), Saez et al. (2012), Liebman et al. (2009), Lehmann et al.
(2013), Bozio et al. (2017)). The results in this paper suggest that it is unlikely that workers
value social security benefits at actuarially fair rates.
7The paper makes several contributions to a literature that specifically studies mini-jobs in
Germany. This is the first paper to document the large bunching at the mini-job threshold and
estimate the corresponding elasticity of earnings with respect to net-of-tax rate. Second, this
5
1 Institutional Setting
Marginal employment, or mini-jobs, have existed in Germany since 1977. From
1999 until April 2003 marginal employment included jobs in which employees
earned less than e325 per month and worked less than 15 hours per week.8 The
employer paid 22% social security tax while the employee was exempt from both
social security and income taxes. The mini-job threshold applied to the sum of
earnings and if these earnings exceeded the mini-job threshold, employees were
subject to regular social security contributions (combined 42%) and income taxes
on the entire earnings. The e325 threshold thus represented a large notch for
employees, particularly for married women with high-earning spouses.9
The Hartz II reforms introduced on April 1, 2003 abolished the hour con-
straint and increased the monthly earnings limit to e400. In addition, the reform
smoothed the social security notch at the new threshold by substituting it with a
kink. The reduced tax liability was now fully phased out upon reaching e800, at
which point both employees and employers are subject to regular social security
taxes. The reform, however, did nothing to smooth the tax notch in the income
tax liability of married individuals: the reduced rate does not apply to income
taxes. Finally, the employer’s social security tax rate on mini-jobs was increased
from 22% to 25%.10 The mini-job contribution rate was further increased to 30%
on July 1, 2006, but the e400 threshold remained intact until April 1, 2012, at
paper provides compelling empirical evidence that mini-jobs are attractive to firms because of
the lower fringe benefit costs. Previous studies, see Bachmann et al. (2012) and Wippermann
(2012), relied on small surveys of mini-job workers only, providing no evidence as to whether
the fringe benefits are denied to mini-job workers specifically or part-time workers in general.
8There are two types of marginal employment (Geringfu¨gige Bescha¨ftigung) in Germany:
employments with earnings below the mini-job threshold (which are the focus of this paper)
and short-term marginal employments (kurzfristige Bescha¨ftigung), which are not subject to
an earnings limit but are limited in duration to 50 working days or two months per year. This
second type of employment is significantly less popular than mini-jobs and is not the focus of
this paper.
9In Germany, married couples are taxed based on the joint income, though there is no
marriage penalty. The income schedule for married couples is based on brackets that are twice
the size of single individuals. However, spouses may elect, if they choose, to be taxed separately.
10The 2003 reform also allowed workers in regular employment to hold one mini-job tax-
free. While multiple mini-jobs are still added up to determine one’s social security tax liability,
individuals who hold at least one job paying more than e400 can now hold an additional job
tax-free (see Tazhitdinova (2017)). In this study I focus on individuals for who mini-jobs are
the primary employment.
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which point the e400 and e800 thresholds were increased to e450 and e850 re-
spectively. The mini-job threshold, social security tax rates and average income
tax rates are summarized in Table 1. The budget constraints of individuals are
shown in Figure D.1. Beyond tax liability, mini-jobs and regular employments
are subject to the same labor regulations.
It is worth noting that while employers pay “social security” taxes on mini-
job earnings, these contributions do not qualify mini-job workers for benefits
(pension, unemployment credits, and medical insurance) on their own record.
However, mini-job workers can obtain medical insurance on their spouse’s behalf
or on their parents record (if they are under age 18 or students under age 25).
Second, all individuals qualify for non-contributory unemployment assistance or
means-tested social support which provide individuals with monthly stipends and
medical insurance.
2 Behavioral Responses to the Mini-Job Threshold
2.1 Conceptual Framework and Elasticity Estimation Procedure
The bunching approach pioneered by Saez (2010) and Kleven and Waseem (2013)
allows researchers to calculate the elasticity of taxable income with respect to
the net-of-tax rate by estimating the excess mass at kinks and notches of the
tax schedule. Both approaches rely on the ability of a researcher to credibly
estimate the counterfactual distribution – hypothetical earnings distribution in
the absence of tax changes. But while kinks and notches both lead to bunching,
they have different implications on the shape of the counterfactual earnings dis-
tribution and therefore require different approaches to recover it. In this section
I extend the framework of Saez (2010) and Kleven and Waseem (2013) and con-
sider large simultaneous kinks and notches. Following the literature, I assume
individuals maximize quasi-linear utility functions u(c, z) = c − n
1+1/ε
(
z
n
)1+1/ε
that are increasing in consumption c and decreasing in before-tax income z sub-
ject to a budget constraint c = z − T (z). For simplicity of exposition, I assume
that the heterogeneity in incomes z stems only from the heterogeneity in abilities
imbedded in utility functions u(c, z) and extend the analysis to a more generous
case in Appendix A.3.
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Let individuals’ tax liability T (z) depend on their gross income z:
T (z) =
{
t1z if z ≤ K
∆T + t1K + t2(z −K) if z > K,
(1)
where t1 and t2 are marginal tax rates below and above some fixed threshold K
and ∆T is a lump-sum tax individuals must pay whenever their earnings exceed
K. The tax schedule thus presents a combined kink-notch at K, where t2 − t1
determines the size of the kink, and ∆T the size of the notch.
Figure 1 illustrates the differential effects of kinks and notches on labor sup-
ply. Panel A shows the budget constraint (1), drawn in bold. The increase in the
tax rate from t1 to t2 rotates the budget constraint at the threshold, resulting in
a dashed line. Individuals who wish to earn between K and zkink under the tax
rate t1 would instead bunch and earn income K when the tax rate increases to
t2. Thus, the kink generates some bunching as shown in Panel B and leads to
a parallel leftward shift of the distribution of earnings. At the same time, the
discrete increase in the tax liability generated by the pure notch ∆T shifts the
budget constraint downward from the dashed line to a bold line, as shown in
Panel A of Figure 1. This notch creates a region of strictly dominated incomes,
so that no individual would choose to earn between K and znotch. The notch
thus leads to further bunching at the threshold K and generates a hole in a final
distribution of incomes, as shown in Panel B with a bold curve.
Panels A and B of Figure 1 show that the the missing mass does not equal
to the entire bunching but only to the portion attributed to the notch. Therefore
to construct a credible counterfactual distribution, one must determine what
proportion of bunching is to be attributed to the kink rather than the notch.
Kleven and Waseem (2013) show that the total bunching is given by
Btotal ≈ ∆ztotal · h(K), (2)
where h(K) denotes the counterfactual density at the threshold K and ∆ztotal
solves
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(
1+
1
∆ztotal/K
)(
1− t2
1− t1
+
∆T/K
1− t1
)
−
1
1+1/ε
(
1
1 + ∆ztotal/K
)1+1/ε
−
1
1 + ε
(
1−
t2 − t1
1− t1
)1+ε
. (3)
Setting ∆T = 0, one can approximate the amount of bunching due to the kink
as in Saez (2010):
Bkink ≈ ∆zkink · h(K) =
[(
1− t1
1− t2
)ε
− 1
]
·K · h(K). (4)
Equation (2) thus relates the amount of total bunching at the threshold,
Btotal, to the elasticity of earnings with respect to net-of-tax rate, ε, while equa-
tions (2) and (4) together specify the proportions of total bunching attributable
to the kink and the notch. Because the share of bunching due to the notch is not
proportional to the elasticity, one must know the underlying elasticity in order
to accurately estimate the counterfactual density – the density that describes
what the earnings distribution would be if the tax liability did not change at
the threshold. Since this elasticity is unknown and is the variable of interest, I
implement an iterative procedure that starts with an elasticity guess and iterates
until a fixed point is found. Below I summarize key points of the estimation al-
gorithm which closely follows the established approaches of Chetty et al. (2011)
and Kleven and Waseem (2013); detailed explanation is available in Appendix
Section A.2.
I start with an elasticity guess e0 and calculate a predicted proportion of
bunching due to the notch, π0notch ≡ 1−B
0
kink/B
0
total, using equations (2) and (4).
Next, I generate a counterfactual distribution by fitting a high degree polynomial
to the observed density excluding a region around the mini-job threshold. The
polynomial is fit in such a way as to equate the proportion of excess mass due
to the notch, π0notch to the missing mass to the right of the threshold. Next, I
adjust the estimated counterfactual distribution rightward until the area under
the entire counterfactual density equals the area under the observed distribution,
to account for the fact that the excess mass due to the kink comes from the in-
dividuals moving from points of the distribution to the right of the threshold.
An estimate of bunching Bˆ0total for the elasticity guess e
0 is then calculated as
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the difference between this adjusted counterfactual and the observed distribu-
tion. The estimated amount of bunching pins down an elasticity of earnings with
respect to the net-of-tax rate eˆ0 through equation (2). If the elasticity estimate
eˆ0 matches the initial guess e0, the initial guess is correct and estimation stops.
If the estimated elasticity does not match the guess, i.e. eˆ0 6= e0, I update the
guess to e1 = eˆ0 and repeat calculations for the new guess. I proceed with these
iterations until a fixed point is achieved, such that eˆk = ek.
Standard errors are calculated using a parametric bootstrap procedure where
a large number of estimated vector of errors εj are drawn from (20) with replace-
ment. The new errors are used to generate a large number of earnings distribu-
tions and, employing the technique above, corresponding estimates of eˆ. Standard
errors are defined as the standard deviation of the distributions of elasticities eˆ.
The bootstrap procedure takes into account both iterative processes: it incorpo-
rates both a search for an optimal missing mass and a search for a fixed point
elasticity.
2.2 Data Description
The main source of data is the weakly anonymous Sample of Integrated Labor
Market Biographies (SIAB, Years 1975 - 2010).11 The SIAB provides informa-
tion on employment, job search and receipt of unemployment benefits for a 2%
sample of the wage earners – 1,639,325 individuals – in Germany from 1975 until
2010. However, the information on mini-job workers who are the main subject
of this study is only available starting from 1999. Employment histories consist
of end-of-the-year notifications and notifications which are submitted when an
employee is hired, terminated, or when an employment is interrupted. Thus if no
changes are made to the employment relationship then only one notification is
recorded per year. Otherwise, multiple notifications, that are precise to the day,
are recorded.12 The data provides basic demographic and establishment charac-
11Data access was provided via on-site use at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the Ger-
man Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) and
subsequently remote data access. For detailed data description see vom Berge et al. (2013).
12Because the SIAB data includes all notifications submitted by employers on behalf of their
employees, some duplicate entries are present. Appendix A.1 carefully describes how duplicate
observations are identified and the number of dropped observations.
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teristics. Unfortunately, marital status and number of children is known only for
benefit recipients and those engaged in job search.
Since the mini-job threshold applies to combined earnings, I estimate elas-
ticities based on average monthly earnings. For individuals with one episode of
uninterrupted employment per year, average monthly earnings are calculated as
the reported daily wage times the number of days worked divided by 30. For
individuals with multiple employment periods, I focus on the period of longest
employment and disregard any employments that do not overlap with the “main”
episode by at least 5 days. I then calculate the average monthly earnings as the
sum of earnings from all employments divided by the duration of the “main”
spell. The core sample is restricted to individuals in regular and marginal jobs
who are not receiving unemployment benefits; employments of other types, e.g.
trainees, casual workers, etc, are dropped. Unless otherwise noted I further re-
strict the sample to individuals aged 31 through 54. I do so for two reasons: first,
a large number of secondary and postsecondary students receive funding through
the Federal Training Assistance Act (BAfo¨G). While the students are allowed to
hold part-time jobs, BAfo¨G stipends are withdrawn euro per euro when earnings
exceed e400 per month. Second, individuals in partial retirement or on disability
insurance, which are most commonly claimed starting from the age of 55, become
subject to an earnings test on their benefits when the earnings exceed e400.
Because of the joint taxation of married couples, the size of the tax notch
and marginal tax rate change at the mini-job threshold depend on individual’s
marital status. Since the SIAB data does not contain information on spousal
earnings, I estimate income tax notch ∆TIncome and the marginal tax rate τIncome
in Table 1 using the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).13 When calculating
spousal incomes I take two types of earnings into account: labor earnings (regular
and self-employed) and social security pensions (old-age, disability, and widow-
hood).14 Further, using the results from Doerrenberg et al. (2017), I assume that
13For the details of the calculations see Appendix A.5.
14Prior to 2005 statutory pensions were tax-exempt. Starting from 2005, 50% of pension
earnings are subject to income tax, and the percentage has been increasing by 2 percentage
points each year. Taxation of private pensions vary and for this reason are not included in the
main analysis. In the Appendix A.5 I consider alternative income specifications and show that
calculations are not sensitive to the specification because the vast majority of Germans rely on
statutory pensions as their main source of income during retirement.
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individuals can claim 20% of their earnings as deductions.15 Table 1 shows that
women experience the largest income tax notch at the threshold, ranging from
e71 to e88 depending on the year. Men experience smaller income notch at the
threshold, ranging from e25 to e34.
Because employer taxes differ between mini-job and regular workers, I calcu-
late elasticities using changes in marginal tax rates that apply to gross earnings
– actual wages paid plus the employer portion of social security taxes and I as-
sume that the social security and income taxes are fully passed through to the
employee. Finally, my elasticity estimates rely on two additional assumptions.
First, that individuals do not value social security benefits (unemployment insur-
ance, health insurance and pension insurance). Second, I assume that only tax
liabilities change at the threshold. Thus I disregard the possibility that mini-jobs
and regular jobs differ in job security, likelihood of promotion, or fringe benefits.
Since regular jobs are likely to provide better long term prospects, the elasticity
estimates again represent a lower bound on the true elasticities of earnings. I
return to this assumption in Section 3 where I study fringe benefits of mini-job
and regular workers using a different dataset.
2.3 Estimates of Labor Responses to the Mini-Job Threshold
2.3.1 Graphical Evidence
Figure 2 shows the distributions of monthly posted (exclusive of employer social
security taxes) wage earnings of women and men aged 31 through 54 by calendar
year. Each point shows the number of individuals in a e25 bin, scaled to represent
the German population in that year from a 2% SIAB representative sample. The
vertical red lines identify mini-job thresholds: e325 prior to 2003 and e400
thereafter. Both men and women show strong responses to tax incentives in the
form of sharp bunching at the threshold. Bunching is concentrated just below the
threshold with little excess mass above the threshold consistent with the existence
of a notch. The positive mass to the right of the threshold indicates that some
individuals experience large frictions and are not able to adjust working hours
15As a robustness check, I also consider a more conservative assumption that individuals
only take advantage of the wage-related expenses deduction (“Werbungskosten”) and other
deductible expenses deduction (“Sonderausgabenpauschbetrag”) in the Appendix A.5.
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as necessary. Bunching is substantially larger for women than for men which
is consistent with women experiencing larger tax changes at the threshold due
to income taxes and hence stronger incentives to bunch. When the threshold
increases from e325 to e400 on April 1, 2003, bunching adjusts quickly but not
immediately. In the year of the change, in 2003, there is substantial bunching at
the new threshold. Already by the end of 2004 roughly two thirds of the excess
mass is shifted to the new threshold (also see Gudgeon and Trenkle (2017)).16
Appendix Figures D.2 and D.3 show earnings distributions for men and
women by 4 age groups. Bunching patterns show substantial heterogeneity, with
women showing an inverse U-shaped and men showing U-shaped relationship
between bunching and age. The patterns are consistent with individuals’ tax in-
centives throughout the lifecycles: for women, spousal incomes and child-rearing
responsibilities are largest mid-life. For men, low-paid jobs are most common in
younger ages and in early retirement. Figures D.2 and D.3 also show considerable
heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment to the new threshold. Judging by the
excess mass at the e325 threshold in 2003–2005, older individuals, particularly
older men, adjust the slowest.
2.3.2 Elasticity Estimates
I follow the estimation procedure outlined in Section 2.1 and tax rate changes
described in Section 2.2 to calculate the earnings elasticities with respect to net-
of-tax rate. Panel A of Table 2 summarizes elasticity estimates and corresponding
excess mass by year for men and women.17 To calculate elasticities, I fit a 7th
degree polynomial to the empirical distribution of gross earnings in order to
account for differences in employer-paid social security taxes below and above the
threshold.18 The lower bound of the exclusion region zl is determined visually
16Another observation from Figure 2 is that individuals do not respond to a concave kink
point at e800 generated by the phasing out of social security contributions starting from 2003.
17Excess mass measures the amount of bunching at the threshold as percent of the coun-
terfactual density in that region, see definition (21) in Appendix A.2. The actual fits of the
counterfactual distributions are available in the Appendix Figures D.4 and D.5.
18Assuming wages reflect all labor costs, an individual earning e400 in a mini-job in 2010
would have to work more hours than a person earning e400 in a regular job, because the
employer-paid social security tax rate for mini-jobs was approximately 10% higher than for
regular jobs. The empirical distributions are generated by multiplying reported posted earnings
of mini-job workers by 1 + τMini and earnings of regular employees by 1 + 0.5τFull. Because
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and ranges from 4 bins (not including the threshold bin) in 1999-2002 to 7 bins
in 2003-2005. The estimation procedure starts with an initial guess of e0 = 0.01
and iterates until a fixed point is reached. Bootstrap standard errors are based
on 1000 iterations. Appendix A.4 shows that results are robust to the choice of
income bin width, degree of polynomial and income definition.
The results in Table 2 show that yearly elasticity point estimates range from
0.08 to 0.18 for women and 0.07 to 0.32 for men. Excess bunching, on the other
hand, shows smaller variation, ranging from 12.67 to 16.48 for women and from
8.1 to 12.69 for men. Both sets of elasticities show an upward trend, with larger
elasticities in 2007-2010 than in 1999-2002. Table 2 suggests that earnings re-
sponses to the mini-job threshold are large. If the magnitude of the observed
response is driven by individuals’ preferences, we should observe substantially
smaller bunching for individuals who experience smaller tax changes at the mini-
job threshold. On the other hand, if the large bunching is due to firms readily
offering mini-job positions, at-the-threshold jobs will be “diffused” across pop-
ulation groups and we will see substantial bunching regardless of individual’s
status. To investigate how the magnitude of response changes with individuals’
incentives, I divide the sample into several groups: individuals with multiple jobs,
single individuals, women and men of different ages. The results described below
show that at-the-threshold jobs are readily available in the labor market and are
often held by individuals who have small incentives to bunch (e.g. singles, men)
or none at all (individuals with multiple jobs before 2003).
Figure 3 focuses on individuals with multiple jobs. Prior to 2003, the mini-job
threshold applied to cumulative earnings, therefore, individuals who had a regular
job had no incentive to limit their secondary earnings to the mini-job threshold,
since doing so would not reduce their tax bill. Nevertheless, Figure 3 shows
substantial bunching at the mini-job threshold in the distribution of secondary
earnings in 1999-2002.19 This bunching has been termed “firm bunching” by
τMini > τFull there is a small number of regular employees whose gross earnings fall in the
interval (K(1+0.5τFull),K(1+τMini)]. These individuals are dropped, so that all observations
below the gross mini-job threshold K(1 + τMini) correspond to observations below the official
posted mini-job threshold K.
19Starting from 2003, individuals with a regular job are allowed to hold one-mini job tax-free.
This reform lead to an increase in take up of secondary jobs, with a large number of these jobs
being at-the-threshold jobs (Tazhitdinova (2017)).
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Chetty et al. (2011) and is a direct evidence of firm responses to the mini-job
threshold.
Panel B of Table 2 shows how labor supply responses vary by marital status
and age. Recall that mini-jobs exempt workers from employee-paid social secu-
rity taxes and income taxes. Because mini-job earnings are too low to qualify
for income taxes, for these individuals bunching at the mini-job threshold iden-
tifies responses to changes in social security liability only. Table 2 shows elastic-
ity estimate for a selected sample of plausibly single individuals.20 The results
show reasonable elasticity estimates in 1999–2002 when single individuals expe-
rienced a large social security notch. However, when the notch was eliminated
in 2003–2010, the elasticity estimates double, reflecting similarly large number of
individuals in at-the-threshold jobs despite a decrease in tax incentives to bunch,
suggesting that the decision to bunch is not driven by individuals’ preferences
alone. Next, elasticities by age groups are also consistent with job diffusion pre-
diction: individuals that experience relatively small incentives to stay below the
threshold show larger elasticities than individuals with stronger incentives. For
example, women and men under age 31 or over age 55 appear to be significantly
more responsive to tax incentives than individuals aged 31-54.
To summarize, the results show large bunching and higher corresponding
elasticities among individuals with weaker financial incentives to stay below the
mini-job threshold: I document larger elasticities for men than women, unusually
strong responses among younger and older workers, high elasticities for single
individuals, and I observe bunching among secondary job holders who have no
incentives to bunch. These findings suggest that the decision to bunch is not
driven by workers’ preferences alone, that mini-jobs are readily offered on the
market and that individuals experience large frictions that prevent them from
finding ideal jobs.
20The SIAB provides information on individual’s marital status only when individuals apply
for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits or register with an employment agency. For this
reason, my sample of “single” individuals includes workers who have applied for UI or registered
with an employment agency at least twice during 1999-2010 and who reported being single
on their applications. I then assume that these individuals had the same marital status in
between the reports. To minimize the impact of selection (individuals are selected based on
their unemployment or job search experience), I further require that these individuals have at
least a 3 year gap between UI applications and only include years when individuals did not
receive UI benefits.
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2.3.3 Explaining the Large Magnitude of Response
Estimated elasticities are substantially larger than have been previously estimated
using the bunching method, raising a concern as to whether they accurately rep-
resent individuals’ preferences. Previous studies focused on taxable income rather
than wage earnings, thus evaluating both real and avoidance responses, and esti-
mated elasticities of less than 0.06.21 Instead, elasticities in Table 2 are of compa-
rable magnitude to elasticities estimated using non-bunching methods that often
yield larger elasticities.22 In the rest of this section I discuss whether the focus
on (1) part-time workers in (2) Germany, or the (3) the large magnitude of tax
changes, (4) their salience, or (5) evasion can explain the large bunching. I con-
clude that these five institutional features cannot present a sufficient explanation
for the large magnitude of observed response.
First, it is unlikely that German workers are more responsive to tax incentives
than workers in other countries. Using 1998 and 2001 waves of Wage and Income
Tax (Lohn- und Einkommensteuerstatistik) datasets, I estimate elasticities of
taxable income around the first kink of the income tax schedule.23 Elasticities
range between 0.04 and 0.08 (Figure D.6) and are several times smaller than
the elasticities estimated in Section 2.3.2, despite reflecting both real responses –
reductions in hours worked – and potential avoidance responses – through income
deductions.24
Second and third, while part time workers have more flexibility in adjusting
their hours, previous studies (e.g. Saez (2010), Paetzold (2017) and Tazhitdinova
(2015)) failed to uncover large responses within this group of workers. Similarly,
previous studies that considered very large tax changes also found weak responses:
Bastani and Selin (2014) and Paetzold (2017) study responses to kink points at
which income tax increased from 36.4% to 59.7% or from 0% to 38.33% respec-
21For comparison, Saez (2010) finds elasticities of 0.003–0.025 (statistically insignificant) for
wage earners around the EITC limits in the USA; Chetty et al. (2011) estimate elasticities of
approximately 0.01 for all wage earners, 0.02 for women, and 0.06 for married women profes-
sionals in Denmark; and Bastani and Selin (2014) find statistically significant elasticity of 0.001
for wage earners in Sweden.
22Keane (2011) reports an average elasticity of 0.31 across more than 100 studies.
23Unfortunately, a similar exercise cannot be applied to other tax brackets because the income
tax schedule in Germany consists of continuously increasing marginal tax rates.
24Doerrenberg et al. (2017) recently show that the elasticity of taxable income in Germany
is 2-3 times larger than the elasticity of earnings exclusive of deductions.
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tively. Both studies obtain small elasticities of less than 0.1, despite focusing on
taxable income. Studies that rely on notches – Kleven and Waseem (2013) and
Hargaden (2015) – find elasticities of taxable income of less than 0.06 even after
accounting for frictions that individuals experience.25
Fourth, because the mini-job threshold has been nominally fixed for a number
of years, it might appear more salient than inflation-adjusted thresholds studied
by other researchers. However, prior to 1999 the mini-job threshold was inflation-
adjusted, yet bunching is large in 1999. Moreover, bunching adjusts rapidly when
the threshold increases (recall Figure 2) suggesting that people are well aware of
the threshold value.26
Fifth, it is unlikely that the observed bunching is due to collusion of employees
and employers: some mini-jobs are held by workers who do not have an incentive
to collude (Figure 3) and reducing employees earnings to e0 rather than to e400
is more profitable as it avoids employer social security tax. As a robustness check
I study how the amount of bunching and estimated elasticities change with firm
size in Table D.1. While bunching is larger for smaller firms that have greater
abilities to collude, the difference is not substantial.
Finally, estimated elasticities could be biased upward if the mini-job thresh-
old leads to strong extensive margin responses. Such responses would lower the
observed distribution to the right of the threshold but leave the distribution to
the left unchanged, leading to overestimated bunching. Since the 2003 reform
reduced the marginal tax rate above the threshold, individuals who quit the la-
bor force had an incentive to return. Figure D.7 overlaps 2002, 2003 and 2004
distributions for women and shows no increases in participation rates to the right
of the threshold. This provides some evidence that extensive margin bias is likely
to be small.27
25Kleven and Waseem (2013) use the share of unresponsive workers to scale elasticities to
account for the percent of individuals affected by the frictions costs in Pakistan and calculate
an upper bound on the taxable income elasticity of less than 0.035 for wage earners. Applying
this approach to this paper would make elasticities even larger.
26Further, Paetzold (2017) studies nominally fixed threshold and finds weak bunching. Fi-
nally, it is important to note that there is nothing a priori more salient about mini-job rules.
Mini-jobs are widely advertised on job search exchanges, however, this form of salience can be
the result of their popularity rather than the cause of it.
27A recent study explored the importance of extensive margin responses on the elasticity
estimates around a large notch in the disability insurance system in Austria and found the bias
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3 Differences in Wages and Fringe Benefits
So far we have assumed that job choice is driven by tax considerations alone.
However, it is possible that mini- and regular jobs differ in aspects other than
taxes. In this section I use detailed firm and household data to explore how
mini- and regular jobs differ in working hours, wages, fringe benefits, as well
employment durations.
3.1 Empirical Approach
Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose firms are perfectly com-
petitive and pay wages w1 and w2 to mini-job and regular workers according to
the labor market equilibrium. Assume that firm f production needs require an
employee i who would work hif hours per week. A firm searches for a worker in
the labor market and hires one as a mini-job worker if the hour needs are low and
hif · w1 ≤ K, and as a regular worker otherwise. Because the mini-job threshold
K is set exogenously by the government and as long as production hour needs
arrive at random, the equilibrium wage differential log(w1/w2) if given by β0 from
log(wif) = α0 + β0 ·Miniif + α1 ·Dif +X
′
i · γ + F
′
f · θ + ui, (5)
where wif defines hourly gross wage of individual i working at establishment f ,
Miniif indicates whether the job individual holds is a mini-job, X is a vector of
individual controls, and F is a vector of firm controls.
In practice, observed individual controls X omit such important wage deter-
minants as ability, work effort, etc. I use two approaches to generate an unbiased
estimate of wage and fringe benefit differential β0 of mini- and regular workers.
First, I restrict the sample to individuals with plausibly similar skills. A reason-
able proxy for skills is income itself: individuals earning similar incomes are likely
to have similar abilities. Specifically, I restrict the sample to a narrow window
around the mini-job threshold, [K−e50, K+e100].28 Second, I use income as a
proxy for skills by including a polynomial of income in specification (5). This
to be very small (Ruh and Staubli (2017)).
28Note that a slightly larger window is used to the right of the threshold because the number
of observations is smaller.
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leads to the following econometric model:
log(wif) = α0 + β0 ·Miniif + α1 ·Dif + α2 ·D
2
if + β1 ·Dif ·Miniif
+ β2 ·D
2
if ·Miniif +X
′
i · γ + F
′
f · θ + ui, (6)
where Dif ≡ (Yif −K)/K is the percent difference between individual’s income
Yif and the mini-job threshold K. In this case, I restrict the sample to employ-
ments with monthly earnings under e1,500 per month and include wage trend
polynomials of second degree. In both cases, the coefficient of interest, β0, cap-
tures the discontinuity of wages or fringe benefits at the mini-job threshold.
A natural concern of specification (6) is that individuals might select into
mini-jobs based on unobserved preferences or abilities. Alternatively, only certain
types of jobs, which qualities are not observed to the researcher, might be allowed
under the mini-job status. As the results show, mini-jobs typically offer worse
working conditions than regular part-time jobs, therefore selection into mini-jobs
should primarily depend on one’s savings due to the mini-job tax exemptions.
To control for this type of selection, I include, whenever available, a measure of
potential tax savings which depends on individual’s marital status and spousal
earnings. Further, if workers are negatively (positively) selected into the mini-job
status, they should receive both lower (higher) wages and lower (higher) fringe
benefits. The results in Section 3.3 are not consistent with this pattern and
suggest that selection is unlikely to play an in important role.
3.2 Data Description
I estimate specification (6) using two distinct datasets: a survey of firms and a
survey of households. The survey of firms is a large dataset that provides reliable
information on working hours and earnings, however, the dataset is not represen-
tative of the German population since only firms with 10 or more employees are
surveyed. Moreover, the data does not include information on family structure
or individuals’ incentives to hold mini-jobs. The household survey, on the other
hand, is representative of the population and includes detailed family structure,
however, this survey more likely to suffer from measurement error because all
information is self-reported. For both datasets, I restrict the core sample to in-
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dividuals working more than 1 hour but not more than 45 hours per week, aged
16 to 80 and earning between e50 and e1500 per month. Appendix Tables D.6
and D.7 provide summary statistics.
First, I use 2006 and 2010 waves of the Structure of Earnings Survey (Verdien-
ststrukturerhebung or VSE). To create the VSE the German Federal Statistical
Offices survey a large sample of firms with ten employees or more in selected
industries.29 In addition to working hours and mini-job identifiers, the VSE con-
tains information on the employees themselves (age, sex, experience, training),
their jobs (working hours, overtime hours, regular pay and bonuses, number of
vacation days), and firms’ characteristics (number of employees, industry, appli-
cable bargaining agreements, geographical location).30
Second, I also use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) introduced in
Section 2.2. Compared to VSE, the SOEP supplies more detailed information
of worker’s characteristics, such as working experience, citizenship status, and
spousal earnings. However, the quality of self-reported marginal employment
status identifier is poor and for this reason, I identify mini-job workers based on
the magnitude of self-reported income.
3.3 Estimates of Wage and Fringe Benefits Differences
3.3.1 Graphical Evidence
Before estimating equations (5) and (6) I examine how reported hours, wages
and fringe benefits change with workers’ earnings visually in Figures 5 (VSE)
and D.9 (SOEP). Panel A, B and C show that there is a clear increasing trend
29VSE 2006 included businesses operating in mining and quarrying; manufacturing; energy
and water supply; construction; trade; maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and personal
and household goods; hotels and restaurants; transport, storage and communications; finan-
cial intermediation; real estate, renting and business activities; education, health and social
work, other public and personal services sectors. VSE 2010 added employees working in public
administration, defense and social security.
30The VSE 2006/2010 provide two estimates of working hours. The first estimate is based on
the regular or customary hours in the survey month (October). The second measure is based
on the total paid hours worked during the survey month, actual or estimated by the firm. As
expected, the first measure of hours is often missing for part-time workers who do not have
fixed hour schedules, but the second measure of hours is almost fully complete. I rely on the
second measure of hours – hours worked in the month of survey – complemented with the first
measures – regular hours – whenever missing. The results that rely on the first definition of
hours are very similar.
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in the number of working hours, gross and posted wages but with no apparent
discontinuity at the mini-job threshold.31 In contrast, panel D shows that net
wages are higher for mini-job workers than regular workers consistent with mini-
job workers paying lower income and social security taxes.
Panels E and F show that mini-job workers receive substantially smaller
yearly bonuses (which include holiday, Christmas and performance bonuses, sev-
erance payments, profit sharing, bonuses for improvement suggestions, allowances
for inventions, and the taxable value of stock options) and are eligible for fewer
full-time equivalent vacation days than regular workers. This evidence is consis-
tent with survey evidence of Bachmann et al. (2012) and Wippermann (2012),
who find that many individuals are unaware of their rights and do not receive
required by law holiday pay, sick day pay and etc.
Figure D.9 shows graphical evidence similar to Figure 5 but relies on house-
hold survey data. The results show similar patterns but the hours reported are
higher, either due to sample selection or measurement errors. It is possible that
individuals working in firms with 10 employees or less (not included in the VSE)
earn lower hourly wage. Alternatively, survey respondents in the SOEP might
include all hours worked, including overtime or regardless of whether they were
paid for these hours or not.
3.3.2 Regression Estimates
I now turn to regression evidence. Results from the VSE (firm survey) are pre-
sented in Table 3. Columns (1) through (5) estimate specification (6) within a
narrow window of earnings around the mini-job threshold: only individuals earn-
ing between e375 to e500 are included. Columns (6) through (9) extend the
window and include individuals earning between e50 and e1500 per month. Ta-
ble 3 provides results for several dependent variables: logarithm of hourly gross,
posted and net wages, yearly bonus (in euros), the number of full-time equivalent
vacation days, and the logarithm of total gross wage calculated as the sum of
31However, in the VSE data some individuals with incomes below the mini-job threshold
are regular employees, while some individuals with incomes above the threshold are mini-job
workers. If one restricts the sample to individuals whose incomes and mini-job status correspond
precisely, the discontinuity in gross wages at the mini-job threshold becomes apparent, see
Figure D.8.
21
all yearly payments divided by total yearly hours. Table 3 shows that gross and
net wages are respectively 6-9% and 15-23% higher for mini-job workers than
regular employees, while posted wages are approximately equal. Consistent with
graphical evidence from Figure 5, mini-job workers receive smaller yearly bonuses
– e60-100 less – and fewer vacation days – 2-3 days less – than regular employ-
ees. These results are robust across all 9 specifications. Including firm fixed
effects in columns (2), (3), (4), (7) and (9) increases the wage differential but
reduces the differences in fringe benefits, with likely explanation that firms that
hire mini-job workers are more “frugal” and pay lower wages and smaller fringe
benefits in general. Since wages show increasing trends both below and above the
mini-job threshold, including linear and quadratic trends also increases the wage
differential between the gross wages paid to mini-job and to regular workers.
Finally, the last dependent variable incorporates fringe benefits (bonuses and
vacation day pay) into a measure of total labor costs and shows that accounting
for bonuses and vacation pay does not equate the labor expenditures on mini-job
workers and regular employees, but it reduces the difference substantially.32 Un-
fortunately, the yearly bonuses and vacation days do not cover all fringe benefits
received by the employees. For example, sick day pay, statutory holiday pay, and
maternity leave payments are not included. Nevertheless, the results in Table
3 suggest that employers are willing to pay mini-job workers higher gross wages
because they incur lower fringe benefit costs.
The regression results from the SOEP (household survey) are available in
Table 4 and reinforce the finding that mini-job wages are higher at the threshold
than regular wages. Columns (1) and (6) can be directly compared to columns
(1) and (6) of Table 3, while columns (3) and (8) provide the closest compari-
son to columns (4) and (8) of Table 3 respectively. The gross wage differential
varies between 6.5% to 13.7%, and thus is quite a bit larger in the SOEP than
in the VSE. Yearly bonus appears to be smaller for mini-job workers, but not all
coefficients are statistically significant.33 In columns (2), (4), (5), (7) and (9), I
control for incentives to bunch at the threshold by including the variable indi-
32The dependent variable is calculated as the sum of all yearly gross wages plus yearly bonuses
plus the number of vacation days times 7.5 hours times the gross wage divided by the yearly
equivalent of hours worked.
33Vacation information is not available in the SOEP.
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vidual notch which measures the size of the tax notch experienced by a worker
at the mini-job threshold and is based on spousal earnings. Results suggest that
controlling for marital status and tax incentives does not have a large effect on
the wage differential. This finding is reassuring in light of my inability to control
for family characteristics in Table 3, and again supports the notion that selection
is unlikely to explain the differences in wages and fringe benefits.
Appendix Table D.8 considers interactions of the mini-job indicator with
gender and age indicators, and indicators of collective agreements. Results sug-
gest that the wage differential is largely not affected by gender or age. However,
the wage differential is reduced by the presence of an enterprise-level agreement.
Finally, Appendix Tables D.9 and D.10 show that estimates in Tables 3 and 4
are robust to sample selection and hour definitions.
3.4 Re-evaluating Elasticity Estimates
The results in Tables 3 and 4 provide clear evidence that mini-jobs differ from reg-
ular jobs in multiple dimensions: in addition to a change in tax treatment, gross
wages and fringe benefits (e.g. vacation pay and yearly bonuses) also change at the
threshold. How do these findings affect the estimates of elasticities in Section 2?
The answer to this question depends on how individuals value fringe benefits. If
individuals assign an actuarially fair value to fringe benefits and total gross wages
correctly reflect differences in employer fringe benefits, then elasticity estimates
are correct. On the other hand, if the fringe benefits are not valued by workers
and the total labor costs are not equalized, then in addition to tax-induced notch
and kink individuals experience a further notch due to differences in wages, and
hence elasticity estimates are wrong. Vacation pay and bonus payments as well
as other benefits that mini-job workers appear not to receive according to sur-
vey evidence from Bachmann et al. (2012) and Wippermann (2012) – sick day
pay, statutory holiday pay, maternity pay and company training – are mostly
monetary benefits and therefore likely to be valued fully. Therefore, since the
distribution of earnings used to estimate elasticities in Section 2.3.2 is inclusive
of bonus payments, as well as vacation, sick day and statutory pay, elasticities
estimated in Section 2.3.2 should provide accurate estimates of the elasticities of
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earnings with respect to the net-of-tax rate.34
4 Theoretical Framework
To understand how differences in fringe benefits experienced by firms may af-
fect labor supply responses, I extend the framework of Chetty et al. (2011) and
develop a partial equilibrium tax incidence model with job search costs and en-
dogenous hour constraints. I show that the magnitude of labor supply responses
depends on the statutory incidence of taxes and that labor supply responses are
strongest when the statutory incidence falls on firms. The model thus helps
explain the large observed bunching at the mini-job threshold documented in
Section 2.
4.1 Baseline Model with Zero Search Costs
Labor Demand. A continuum of firms offers two types of employment: type 1
jobs (mini-jobs) that incur employer-paid taxes φ1 and type 2 jobs which impose
employer-paid tax φ2. In line with Chetty et al. (2011), I assume that firms
cannot change working hours after the firm has been matched with a worker.
Each firm posts job offers for each type of employment; combined these postings
generate an aggregated distribution of hours offered. Both types of labor are
employed in a one-factor production technology Qi(·) that produces goods sold
at a fixed price. I assume that differences in type 1 and 2 employments stem
exclusively from the exogenous government policy and therefore type 1 and type
2 workers are perfectly substitutable. Each firm i determines optimal quantities
of total labor hours in each type of jobs, L1i and L2i, by minimizing costs subject
to a quantity constraint:
min
L1i,L2i
Ci = (w1L1i + w2L2i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wages
+ (w1φ1L1i + w2φ2L2i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Auxiliary Labor Costs
s.t. Qi(L1i + L2i) = Q¯i. (7)
34I also consider whether mini-jobs and regular jobs differ in dismissal costs. Figure 4 shows
the cumulative distributions of employment durations based on the SIAB data described in
Section 2.2. To construct Figure 4, I assume that employment spell is terminated if an individual
quits labor force, switches to a different establishment, or employment is interrupted for more
than 30 days. The results suggests that at-the-threshold mini-job workers enjoy similar job
durations as regular part-time workers.
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Aggregating the first order conditions across a spectrum of firms yields a system
of labor demand equations
w1 =
∫
i
λiQ
′
i
1 + φ1
and w2 =
∫
i
λiQ
′
i
1 + φ2
. (8)
Therefore when workers are perfectly substitutable any tax differences which
statutory incidence falls on workers will not affect the wage differential between
type 1 and type 2 jobs: when inputs are perfectly substitutable, employers hire
the cheapest form of labor resulting in equalization of labor costs. Since the
subsidies given to the employees do not directly affect firms’ labor costs, they
will not affect the relative prices of two labor inputs.
Labor Supply. Further, suppose that type 1 jobs (mini-jobs) are subject to
employee-paid tax t1, while type 2 jobs (regular jobs) are subject to employee-
paid tax t2. Type 2 jobs are fully unrestricted and allow workers to earn any
amount, while type 1 earnings are limited by a fixed threshold K, uniform to
all workers. Individual k chooses a job from the aggregate distribution of hours
offered with corresponding wages (w1, w2) that maximizes his utility
max
c,l
u(c, l) = c− α
−1/ε
k
l1+1/ε
1 + 1/ε
, (9)
given his individual ability parameter αk, homogeneous elasticity of labor supply
ε, and subject to one of the two constraints:
c = (1− t1)w1l and w1l ≤ K or c = (1− t2)w2. (10)
Define α∗1 ≡ K/((1−t1)w1)
ε+1 and let α∗2 solve u(K,K/w1) = u(α
∗
2(1−t2)
ε+1wε+12 ,
α∗2(1− t2)w
ε
2). Then individuals with ability αk will work l
∗
k hours, where
l∗k =


αk(1− t1)
εwε1 if αk < α
∗
1
K/w1 if α
∗
1 ≤ αk ≤ α
∗
2
αk(1− t2)
εwε2 if αk > α
∗
2
(11)
if (1− t1)w1 > (1− t2)w2. Thus for a cumulative distribution of skills Fα(·) with
corresponding density fα(·), the total labor supply of type 1 and 2 jobs will be
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given by
LS1 =
∫ α∗1
−∞
α(1−t1)
εwε1f(α)dα+
∫ α∗2
α∗1
K/w1f(α)dα and L
S
2 =
∫ ∞
α∗2
α(1−t2)
εwε2f(α)dα.
(12)
Equilibrium. The equilibrium wages and quantities of labor will depend on tax
rates t1, t2, φ1, φ2 and on elasticities of labor supply and demand. Then with L
S
1
and LS2 given by (12), equilibrium wages w
∗
1 and w
∗
2 solve
w∗1 =
w
1 + φ1
, w∗2 =
w
1 + φ2
, where w solves LS1 + L
S
2 =
∫
i
(Q′i)
−1(w/λi). (13)
It follows that if mini-job workers and regular workers are perfect substitutes,
the subsidies given to the workers – e.g. exemption from income taxes and social
security payments – can affect the overall levels of wages of all workers but not
the wages of one group in particular.
4.2 Labor Responses in Presence of Frictions
Let f(l;w) and F (l;w) represent the probability density and the cumulative dis-
tribution functions of the distribution of “ideal” hours l∗ given by (11) and (12)
for a vector of wages w = (w1, w2).
35 Now suppose workers are not automatically
matched to their ideal employments. Instead, the labor market clears as follows.
Individuals observe the offered distribution of hours G(l;w) and corresponding
wages w = (w1, w2) and draw a job at random. At this point workers decide
whether to accept the offer or search for an alternative. If a worker with ideal
hours l∗ declines the offer, he draws a new offer from a distribution Gˆl∗(l;G,w)
that depends on his ideal hours l∗ and the distribution of offered hours G. Let
g and gˆl∗ denote the probability density functions of distributions G(l;w) and
Gˆl∗(l;G,w), EF and EGˆl∗ denote expectations based on probability distribution
F and Gˆl∗ respectively, and u(l) = u(c(l), l) from (9). Further, assume that the
search distribution Gl∗(l;G,w) satisfies the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. Gl∗(l;G,w) is continuous and differentiable with respect to l;
Assumption 2. Gˆl∗ = 1{l=l∗} when individuals experience zero search costs;
35Note that as long as (1 − t1)w1 > (1 − t2)w2, all jobs with hours l ≤ K/w1 will be of type
1, and all jobs with hours l > K/w1 will be of type 2.
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Assumption 3. Gˆl∗ = G when individuals experience infinite search costs;
Assumption 4. gl∗ satisfies f(l) = f(l)·EF [1{u(l) > EGˆl∗ [u(L)]}]+(1−EF [1{u(l) >
EGˆl∗ [u(L)]}]) · EF [gˆl∗(l)] for a given distribution f .
Assumptions 2 and 3 ensure that when the search process is costly, the search
process results in a wide distribution around around l∗. As search costs decrease,
Gˆl∗ tightens around l
∗ so that Gˆl∗ = 1{l=l∗} whenever search costs are zero. As-
sumption 4 ensures that the ideal distribution of hours F is always accepted by
the workers in aggregate.36
Aggregating across workers, we find the distribution of accepted offers
Gaccepted(l;w) = P (l;F,G, Gˆ,w) ·G(l;w) + (1− P (l;F,G, Gˆ,w)) · Gˆ(l;F,G,w),
(14)
where Gˆ(l;F,G,w) represents the aggregated distribution of offers when individ-
uals engage in job search and P (l;F,G, Gˆ,w) represents the probability that a
job is accepted given the distribution of ideal hours F (l;w), offered hours G(l;w),
and job-search distribution Gˆ(l;F,G,w).
Now suppose we start with an equilibrium where employees and employers
pay identical taxes on both types of labor, so that 1− t1 =
1
1+φ1
= 1− t2 =
1
1+φ2
.
The government decides to reduce the tax rate on type 1 workers by setting either
t1 = 0 or φ1 = 0. Does the choice of statutory tax break affect the magnitude
of equilibrium labor response? If neither firms nor individuals experience search
costs, the equilibrium distributions of hours will be the same.37
Now suppose the search process is costly. Then the equilibrium distribution
of hours and corresponding wages must satisfy the following three conditions:
w∗ =
(
w
1 + φ1
,
w
1 + φ2
)
, where w solves
∫ ∞
0
l dG =
∫
i
(Q′i)
−1(w/λi), (15)
G(l) = P (l;F,G, Gˆ,w∗) ·G(l) + (1− P (l;F,G, Gˆ,w∗)) · Gˆ(l;F,G,w∗), (16)
36Note that a job with hours l is drawn with probability g(l) and is accepted with probability
P = EF [1{u(l) > EGˆl∗ [u(L)]}]. The same offer l can alternatively be drawn from distribu-
tions Gˆl∗ with probability EF [gˆl∗(l)]. Therefore the density of accepted jobs gaccepted satisfies
gaccepted(l) = g(l) · EF [1{u(l) > EGˆl∗ [u(L)]}] + (1− EF [1{u(l) > EGˆl∗ [u(L)]}]) · EF [gˆl
∗(l)].
37Since λ
1+φ1
= λ(1 − t1), the after-tax wages will be the same. Because individuals do not
experience search costs, they will only accept ideal hours given by (11) and distribution F will
be an equilibtium.
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∄w < w∗ s.t. (16) is satisfied (17)
Condition (15) determines equilibrium wages w∗ given the total amount of labor
hours L1+L2 =
∫∞
0
ldG implied by the distribution G and follows from (13). Con-
dition (16) ensures that the distribution of offered hours equals the distribution of
accepted hours at the equilibrium wage levels w∗ and follows from (14). Finally,
condition (17) ensures that firms offer higher wages only when they exhaust labor
supply at lower wage levels.38 Define ΩG = {G : G satisfies (15) and (16)}. From
assumption 4 follows that {F} ∈ ΩG and thus when the employee tax t1 is set to
zero, (17) implies ∫ ∞
0
l dG ≥
∫ ∞
0
l dF, (18)
and when employer tax φ1 is set to zero, (17) implies
∫ K/w
0
l dG ≥
∫ K/w
0
l dF,
∫ ∞
K/w
l dG ≥
∫ ∞
K/w
l dF. (19)
Conditions (17) or (18)-(19) set apart cases where the statutory incidence of
taxes falls on firms from cases where it falls on individuals. When the tax break
is given to individuals, 1/(1 + φ1) = 1/(1 + φ2), and wages of type 1 and type
2 workers are identical. Since the wage level is uniform, condition (17) does not
affect the distribution of hours offered, merely the aggregate number of hours
in equilibrium. On the other hand, when the tax break is given to the firms,
equilibrium wages differ for type 1 and type 2 workers. Condition (17) implies
that the total number of hours supplied by type 1 and type 2 workers should be
equal or greater than the number of hours predicted by the frictionless model.
In other words, Condition (17) ensures that the wage level of type 1 workers is
justified: employers have exhausted labor supply at lower wages.
The model thus generates several predictions that differ from the frictionless
case of Section 4.1. First, in presence of frictions, individuals are willing to
accept less-than-ideal job offers resulting in multiple equilibria. For example, an
individual with ideal working hours l∗ would accept job offers with hours l∗ ± ǫ
38Without (17), conditions (15)–(16) allow for counter-intuitive equilibria: in extreme case of
infinite search costs, (15)–(16) imply that firms would pay workers marginal product of labor
regardless of total hours worked. This is counter-intuitive because the workers would accept
the same job offers at lower wages.
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for a small value of ǫ. Larger search costs would lead to larger sets of equilibria.39
Second, if individuals experience search costs, while firms do not, the model
predicts stronger labor supply responses when the statutory incidence falls on
firms, rather than individuals. Conditions (15)–(17) demonstrate the mechanism:
for the wage adjustment to be justified a sufficient number of individuals of each
type must be hired. However, (19) does not impose any requirements on the
distribution of hours: the model does not make predictions about the composition
of tax-advantaged jobs, e.g. what portion of type 1 hours must be offered in the
form of the at-the-threshold jobs, it merely shows that the total number of hours
in type 1 jobs will be large.
The framework so far assumed that firms experience zero frictions and are
able to offer any hour contracts. In reality firms are likely to experience two
types of frictions.40 First, certain hour contracts can be illegal (e.g. workers may
not exceed 40 hours per week without incurring overtime pay) or be prohibitively
expensive (e.g. training and supervision costs rule out 1-hour-per-week jobs).
Such restrictions can be easily incorporated into the model by assuming that
the distribution of hour offers G must belong to the set of feasible offers Γ and
the predictions would remain the same.41 Second, firms are often not able to
change working hours of employees because of contractual obligations. Presence
of contractual obligations does not erase asymmetry of search and adjustment
frictions experienced by individuals and firms, merely slows down the adjustment
process to the new equilibrium. The mechanics are discussed in Appendix C.
4.3 Relation to Mini-Jobs and Discussion
The model of Section 4.2 predicts that a large number of mini-jobs will be offered
in equilibrium because mini-jobs incur lower fringe benefits than regular jobs.
Lower fringe benefits encourage firms to hire mini-job workers until mini-job
wages increase to reflect differences in labor costs. Model predictions are therefore
39See Appendix C for an illustrative example.
40Here I focus on hour constraints and disregard differences in ability. For this reason, I
ignore productivity-matching frictions and defer to future work.
41An exception would be reforms that reduce taxes on “infeasible” workers. In which case,
the equilibrium outcomes will be identical, regardless of whether the tax break is given to
individuals or firms, because firms will ignore such incentives altogether.
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consistent with empirical evidence from Section 2 – large bunching at the mini-job
threshold – and Section 3 – higher gross wages for mini-job workers as compared
to regular workers. The setting studied in this paper is thus in stark contrast
to the majority of previous empirical studies that estimate responses to taxes by
focusing on kinks and notches in the income tax schedules of individuals. Because
the statutory incidence of these changes does not fall on firms, weaker responses
are observed.
The predictions of Section 4.2 raise several important questions. First, if
multiple equilibria are possible, which equilibrium will be observed in the market?
Because firms offer the hour distributions and individuals search among posted
jobs, firms should incorporate the choice of the offered hour distribution into the
profit-maximizing function. In other words, in addition to choosing the total
optimal hours of work L1i and L2i, each firm should further optimize on the
distribution of hours it offers, Gi. Various incentives can make certain hour
distributions preferred to the others. For example, employee training requires the
same amount of expenditures regardless of future working hours of employees.
In case of Germany, training costs would encourage the existence of a double
peaked distribution: with a large number of at-the-threshold mini-jobs and a
large number of full-time-hour jobs. The resulting bunching at the threshold
could then be larger than if it were based on individuals’ preferences alone.42
This possibility raises the second question: to what extent the observed re-
sponses should be attributed to individuals’ preferences alone? If individuals
with no incentives end up holding at-the-threshold mini-jobs, we cannot be cer-
tain that those with incentives have actively chosen mini-jobs. The theoretical
model cautions against attributing such responses to individuals’ preferences in
42Labor regulations can also influence firms’ preferred hour distributions. For example, the
Affordable Care Act requires large firms to provide health insurance for employees working
30 hours per week or more. Will firms offer more 29-hours-or-less jobs? If wages of full-time
workers can adjust downward and individuals value the health insurance provided, then no
bunching will be present because individuals will be willing to accept lower wages in exchange
for health insurance. However, if wages cannot adjust, e.g. because of fairness concerns, then
firms’ and workers’ incentives diverge. Firms have an incentive to hire more 29-hour workers
while workers – assuming they value health insurance – will prefer to work 30 hours with the
goal of gaining insurance coverage. The equilibrium outcome will depend on the magnitude of
search costs experienced by workers. If the search costs are high, firms’ incentive will dominate
and more 29-hour jobs will be offered. If, on the other hand, search costs are low and firms
find it hard to fill 29-hour positions, bunching will be small.
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circumstances where firm incentives differ as well.43
5 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence that in presence of frictions, labor supply
responses are stronger when the statutory incidence of taxes or labor rules falls
on firms. I show that differences in fringe benefits in Germany make mini-jobs
attractive to firms and lead to large bunching at the mini-job threshold.
The findings of the paper stress the importance of firms in the equilibrium
outcomes of labor markets in general. While individuals are likely to suffer from
adjustment costs, information frictions and behavioral biases, and therefore are
constrained in their ability to respond to tax changes and labor regulations, firms
are likely to be more responsive to incentives generated by tax systems and labor
rules. To devise effective labor rules and tax policy, policymakers should carefully
take into account potential firm incentives.
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Table 1: Mini-Job Rules, Social Security Tax Rates, Income Tax Notches and Marginal Tax Rates
Mini-Job Social Security Income Tax Women Income Tax Men
Threshold Mini rate Phase-out rate Full Rate Notch MTR Notch MTR
K τMini τFull ∆TIncome τIncome ∆TIncome τIncome
by year: 1999 325 22 n/a 42 80 25 31 11
2000 325 22 n/a 42 76 24 29 11
2001 325 22 n/a 42 71 22 25 10
2002 325 22 n/a 42 71 22 25 10
2003 400 25 59 42 87 22 32 10
2004 400 25 59 42 82 21 28 9
2005 400 25 59 42 80 20 27 9
2006 400 30 48 39 88 24 34 11
2007 400 30 48 39 88 24 34 11
2008 400 30 48 39 88 24 34 11
2009 400 30 48 39 87 24 33 10
2010 400 30 48 39 86 24 34 10
Notes : This table shows the size of the mini-job threshold (in posted earnings); mini-job (employer only), the phase out and full (combined
employee and employer) social security tax rates; as well as the average income tax notch and income tax marginal tax rate experienced
by individuals at the mini-job threshold. Mini-job social security (SS) rate is charged on incomes below or at the mini-job threshold. The
phase out SS rate is charged on earnings between e400 and e800 from 2003 on. Regular SS rate is charged on incomes above e400 prior
to 2003 and above e800 from 2003 on. Notch is the average lump-sum payment of income tax an individual must make upon exceeding
the mini-job threshold. MTR is the average marginal tax rate at the mini-job threshold. For single individuals, spousal income is set to
zero. Spousal income includes labor earnings, as well as social security pensions. For further details see Section 2.2 and Appendix A.5.
Source: Author’s calculations using Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), version 30.
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Table 2: Elasticity Estimates
Panel A: By Year
Women: Men:
year e s.e.(e) b s.e.(b) e s.e.(e) b s.e.(b)
1999 0.08 0.02 14.35 0.98 0.07 0.04 8.36 1.89
2000 0.11 0.04 15.08 1.68 0.09 0.05 8.81 1.53
2001 0.16 0.04 16.48 1.82 0.11 0.07 8.83 2.01
2002 0.12 0.03 14.59 1.16 0.10 0.06 8.58 1.79
2003 0.08 0.02 12.67 1.06 0.32 0.09 12.69 2.65
2004 0.15 0.03 15.16 1.80 0.30 0.09 11.28 2.48
2005 0.14 0.02 14.28 1.24 0.22 0.06 9.07 1.50
2006 0.14 0.02 14.29 1.36 0.17 0.05 8.10 1.23
2007 0.14 0.02 14.24 1.05 0.27 0.06 10.65 1.35
2008 0.13 0.05 13.78 1.87 0.28 0.14 10.84 3.50
2009 0.18 0.03 16.18 2.49 0.37 0.10 12.51 2.17
2010 0.17 0.02 15.31 1.29 0.34 0.09 11.99 2.13
Panel B: By Age and Marital Status
1999-2002 2003-2005 2006-2010
e s.e.(e) e s.e.(e) e s.e.(e)
Singles: 0.14 (0.06) 0.57 (0.24) 0.55 (0.16)
Women: under 40 0.18 (0.04) 0.22 (0.03) 0.20 (0.02)
31-44 years old 0.07 (0.04) 0.08 (0.01) 0.11 (0.01)
45-54 years old 0.14 (0.05) 0.14 (0.04) 0.13 (0.02)
over 55 0.54 (0.09) 0.81 (0.17) 0.76 (0.11)
Men: under 40 0.15 (0.02) 0.39 (0.04) 0.40 (0.04)
31-44 years old 0.04 (0.05) 0.36 (0.09) 0.21 (0.06)
45-54 years old 0.17 (0.06) 0.58 (0.15) 0.38 (0.07)
over 55 0.47 (0.08) 0.56 (0.08) 0.46 (0.06)
Notes : This table shows elasticities of earnings with respect to net-of-tax rate by gender and
year. These elasticities are estimated using the approach presented in Section 2.1. Source:
Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975 - 2010, Nuremberg 2013.
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Table 3: The Effect of Mini-Job Status on Wages, Bonuses and Vacation Days (Firm Survey VSE)
Monthly Income e375–e500 Monthly Income e50–e1500
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Gross Wage)
Mini-Job 0.060*** 0.091*** 0.057*** 0.088*** 0.062*** 0.094*** 0.095*** 0.062*** 0.070***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Posted Wage)
Mini-Job -0.017*** 0.014*** -0.019*** 0.012** -0.014** 0.016*** 0.017*** -0.015** -0.007*
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Net Wage)
Mini-Job 0.173*** 0.191*** 0.151*** 0.150*** 0.147*** 0.219*** 0.231*** 0.174*** 0.182***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Dependent Variable: Yearly Bonus
Mini-Job -141.561*** -80.246*** -81.099*** -60.706*** -94.085*** -134.388*** -108.769*** -112.651*** -89.406***
(5.195) (4.434) (4.628) (4.834) (5.120) (7.427) (6.115) (5.744) (6.112)
Dependent Variable: Vacation Days
Mini-Job -6.244*** -3.776*** -3.041*** -1.894*** -2.543*** -6.951*** -5.843*** -4.548*** -3.948***
(0.320) (0.171) (0.170) (0.170) (0.210) (0.274) (0.138) (0.291) (0.220)
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Gross Wage incl. Bonus and Vacation Pay)
Mini-Job -0.017** 0.053*** 0.019*** 0.055*** 0.015** 0.015* 0.033*** -0.011** 0.008
(0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Firm FE No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes
Individual Controls No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No No No Yes No No Yes No
Linear Wage Trend No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic Wage Trend No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 107,239 107,239 107,239 107,239 107,239 887,183 887,183 887,183 887,183
Notes : This table shows the coefficients from regressing the listed dependent variables on a mini-job indicator variable. Standard errors
are clustered by firm. Individual controls include male indicator, age group indicators, company tenure, education indicators, occupational
status and occupation indicators and year indicators. Firm controls include industry indicators, geographical indicators, number of male
and female workers, indicators of applicable collective agreements, and indicators of whether a firm is part of a larger enterprise, whether a
firm works in handcrafts, and whether a firm is publicly traded. Linear and quadratic trends include both linear/quadratic terms and their
interactions with the mini-job indicator. Source: FDZ der Statistischen A¨mter des Bundes und der La¨nder, Verdienststrukturerhebung,
2006 and 2010, author’s calculations.
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Table 4: The Effect of Mini-Job Status on Wages and Bonuses (Household Survey SOEP)
Monthly Income e375–e500 Monthly Income e50–e1500
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Gross Wage)
Mini-Job 0.086** 0.065* 0.083** 0.069** 0.137** 0.099*** 0.086*** 0.100*** 0.092***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.033) (0.033) (0.061) (0.022) (0.021) (0.029) (0.029)
Indiv. Notch 0.003*** -0.001 -0.001 0.006*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Posted Wage)
Mini-Job 0.017 -0.004 0.014 -0.000 0.068 0.029 0.016 0.029 0.022
(0.038) (0.038) (0.033) (0.034) (0.061) (0.022) (0.021) (0.029) (0.029)
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Net Wage)
Mini-Job 0.196*** 0.158*** 0.188*** 0.150*** 0.154** 0.242*** 0.230*** 0.177*** 0.177***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.038) (0.039) (0.071) (0.023) (0.024) (0.032) (0.032)
Dependent Variable: Yearly Bonus
Mini-Job -81.028** -79.377** -56.797*** -57.303*** -19.068 15.406 5.503 -31.155 -38.612
(34.184) (35.239) (19.326) (20.189) (31.994) (20.987) (21.776) (28.693) (29.099)
Indiv. Notch -1.399* -2.493*** -2.509*** 3.182*** -0.312
(0.761) (0.868) (0.863) (0.531) (0.702)
Dependent Variable: Log(Gros Wage incl. Bonus)
Mini-Job 0.074* 0.054 0.074** 0.060* 0.132** 0.093*** 0.078*** 0.092*** 0.084***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.033) (0.034) (0.061) (0.022) (0.021) (0.030) (0.030)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indiv. Controls (subset) No No Yes No No No No Yes No
Indiv. Controls (full) No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Linear Wage Trend No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic Wage Trend No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 3,373 3,238 3,357 3,357 3,020 20,581 19,979 20,524 18,889
Notes : This table shows the coefficients from regressing the listed dependent variables on a mini-job indicator variable. Standard errors are
clustered by individual. Individual controls (subset) include male indicator, age group indicators, company tenure, education indicators
and occupation indicators. In addition to above controls, the full set also includes marital status, presence of a partner (if not married),
citizenship indicator, indicator of whether a job matches completed training, experience working full time and experience working part
time. Firm controls include industry indicators and indicators of size (by number of employees). Linear and quadratic trends include both
linear/quadratic terms and their interactions with the mini-job indicator. Source: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), version 30.
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Figure 1: Budget Constraint in Presence of Kink and a Notch
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Notes : Panel A shows the budget constraint of an individual whose marginal tax rate increases from t1 to t2 and who must pay a lump-sum
tax ∆T at the threshold K. Panel B shows the corresponding distribution of earnings in the presence of such tax schedule.
Individuals who wish to earn between K and zkink under the tax rate t1 would instead bunch and earn income K when the tax rate
increases to t2. The cutoff zkink is chosen such that it is the highest income an individual could have earned under the budget constraint
with slope 1− t1 and have his indifference curve tangent to the budget constraint with slope 1 − t2 at the threshold K. The indifference
curves of such an individual are shown as dashed green curves. Thus, the kink will generate some bunching as shown in Panel B and lead
to a parallel leftward shift of the distribution of earnings. The notch will further create a region of strictly dominated incomes, so that no
individual would choose to earn between K and znotch. The cutoff znotch is chosen such that an individual is indifferent between working
more and earning znotch, and working less and earning K. The indifference curves of this person are shown as solid green curves. The
notch will thus lead to further bunching at the threshold K and generate a hole in the final distribution of incomes, as shown in Panel B
with a bold blue curve. The size of the hole to the right of the threshold will not be equal to the entire amount of bunching, but will only
account for the bunching generated by the notch.
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Figure 2: Earnings in 1999–2010
Panel A: Females Panel B: Males
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Notes : This figure shows the distribution of monthly wage earnings (posted) of women and men by calendar year. Each point shows the
number of individuals in a e25 bin, scaled to represent the German population in that year from a 2% random sample. The vertical red
lines identify the mini-job thresholds: e325 prior to 2003 and e400 thereafter. Source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies
(SIAB) 1975 - 2010, Nuremberg 2013.
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Figure 3: “Firm Bunching” – Individuals with Multiple Jobs
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Notes : This figure shows the distribution of posted earnings in a secondary job for individuals
who concurrently hold a secondary job in addition to a “regular” job, defined as a job that pays
more than e325 in 1999-2002. The distribution shown is the average across 1999-2002. Source:
Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975 - 2010, Nuremberg 2013.
Figure 4: Job Duration by Employment Type
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
pe
rc
en
t
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
duration of employment with the same establishment (in years)
Small Mini−Jobs
At−the−threshold Mini−Jobs
Midi−Jobs: (400,800] euro
Regular Jobs: >800 euro
Notes : This figure shows the cumulative distribution function of job durations, calculated as the
time spent at any given establishment with employment breaks of less than 30 days. Job types
defined by monthly earnings in the first year of employment. Small Mini-jobs – employments
with monthly earnings of less than e300. At-the-threshold mini-jobs are – employments with
monthly earnings of [e300,e325]. Midi-jobs – employments with monthly earnings of (e325,
e800]. Finally, regular jobs – employments with monthly earnings of more than e800. Source:
Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975 - 2010, Nuremberg 2013.
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Figure 5: Earnings Distributions, Weekly Hours and Wages by Income (Firm Survey VSE)
Panel A: Weekly Hours by Monthly
Income
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Panel B: Gross Wages by Monthly In-
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Panel C: Posted Wages by Monthly
Income
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Panel D: Net Wages by Monthly In-
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Panel E: Yearly Bonus by Monthly
Income
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Panel F: Vacation Days by Monthly
Income
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Notes : All results are based on the combined 2006 and 2010 waves of Verdienststrukturerhebung (VSE) Survey. Panel A shows the mean,
as well as the 25th and 75th percentiles of weekly hours by e25 bins of monthly pay. Panel B, C and D show the mean, as well as the
25th and 75th percentiles of hourly gross, posted and net wages by e25 bins of monthly pay. Panel E and F shows the mean, as well as
the 25th and 75th percentiles of yearly bonus and the number of full-time equivalent vacation days by e25 bins of monthly pay. Source:
FDZ der Statistischen A¨mter des Bundes und der La¨nder, Verdienststrukturerhebung, 2006 and 2010, author’s calculations.
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APPENDIX FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
A Elasticity Estimation
A.1 SIAB Data
This study uses the weakly anonymous Sample of Integrated Labour Market
Biographies (Years 1975 - 2010).44 The SIAB data includes all notifications sub-
mitted by the employers on behalf of their employees, therefore some duplicate
entries are present. Below I describe the procedure I use to obtain the final
sample of labor histories used in this paper.
Since the study focuses on wage responses to payroll taxes, I focus on in-
dividuals appearing in the Employment History reports (Bescha¨ftigten-Historik
or BeH). There are a total of 29,741,469 split episode BeH observations in the
SIAB and 26,312,013 unsplit episodes. First, I drop all observations from years
before 1999, leaving 11,595,496 unsplit observations. Next, I drop 165,048 obser-
vations that report a zero wage. I also drop all individuals that during a year
are reported to have a job of any type other than regular, part-time, or marginal
employment. In other words, I drop individuals that have reported working as
trainees, partially-retired, interns, student trainees, or casual workers in that par-
ticular year. These drops reduce the dataset to 10,076,812 observations.
Next, I remove duplicate entries. First, I delete all perfect duplicates – 99
observations. Second, I remove all duplicate observations that differ only by
notification reason (“grund”) – 22 observations deleted. Third, I remove all
duplicate observations that differ only by employment status (“erwstat”) – 3
observations. Fourth, I drop observations that differ only by occupational status
and working hours (“stib”) – 2 observations. Fifth, I drop observations that differ
only by occupation (“beruf”) – 2 observations. Sixth, I keep observations with the
largest reported earnings when observations only differ by the amount of earnings
– 13,533 deleted. Finally, I keep observations with the largest earnings when
observations differ only by reason for notification (“grund”) – 1,145 deleted. The
remaining sample consists of 10,062,006 unsplit episode observations or 7,599,850
person-year observations, and covers 1,019,061 individuals who have worked at
1,102,561 distinct establishments.
A.2 Elasticity Estimation Procedure
I start with a guess of elasticity, e0, and estimate predicted proportion of bunching
due to the notch, π0notch ≡ 1 − B
0
kink/B
0
total using equations (2) and (4). Next, I
44For more detailed information, see vom Berge et al. (2013).
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identify a counterfactual distribution by estimating the following regression:
Cj =
q∑
i=0
βi · (Zj)
i +
zu∑
i=zl
γi · 1[Zj = i] + ε
0
j , (20)
where Cj represents the number of individuals in income bin j, Zj is the average
income level in bin j, q is the order of polynomial which is fitted to the counts, zl
and zu determine the size of the excluded region around the mini-job threshold,
such that zl < K ≤ zu.
45 The counterfactual distribution is defined by the pre-
dicted values from (20) omitting the dummies: Cˆ0 =
∑q
i=0 βˆ
0
i ·(Zj)
i. Excess mass
Bˆ0 and missing mass Mˆ0 are calculated as the difference between observed em-
pirical density counts Cj and estimated counterfactual counts Cˆ
0
j in the earnings
intervals (zl, K] and (K, zu] respectively: Bˆ
0 =
∑K
j=zl
(Cj − Cˆ
0
j ) =
∑K
j=zl
γˆ0j and
Mˆ0 =
∑zu
j=K(Cˆ
0
j −Cj) = −
∑zu
j=K γˆ
0
j . The lower bound of the excluded region zl
is estimated visually.46 To estimate zu, I make use of the fact that the amount
of bunching due to the notch should be equal to the missing mass to the right of
the threshold. I start by setting zu = K + 1 and keep increasing zu by one bin
until the estimated excess mass due to the notch equals the estimated missing
mass, i.e. until π0notch · Bˆ
0 = Mˆ0.
The resulting counterfactual, Cˆ0j , does not account for the fact that the ex-
cess mass due to the kink comes from the individuals moving from points of
the distribution to the right of the threshold, and therefore Bˆ0 resulting from
(20) may over- or underestimate the true excess mass. To correct for this I
adjust the estimated counterfactual distribution rightward until the area under
the counterfactual equals the area under the empirical distribution.47 The fi-
nal estimate of bunching for the elasticity guess e0 is then calculated as Bˆ0 =∑K
j=zl
(Cj−Cˆj) =
∑K
j=zl
γˆj where Cˆj =
∑q
i=0 βˆi(Zj)
i are the adjusted fitted values
from regression (20). In line with the previous research, see Chetty et al. (2011)
45Here I assume that bunching will fall into the interval [zl,K] because individuals are unable
to precisely locate at the threshold. Because having income just above the threshold would still
subject a worker to a lump-sum tax notch, the excess mass will be located strictly to the left
of the threshold. The interval (K, zu] determines the interval of earnings where the observed
distribution will lie below the counterfactual distribution.
46This is a standard approach in bunching methodology. While such selection might sound
ambiguous, in practice it is not. Bunching around the threshold is very sharp, and with well-
defined bounds. For discussion see Kleven (2016).
47Recall Figure 1: the original density shifts leftward, reflecting weaker incentives to supply
labor. This adjustment effectively corrects for the shift of the counterfactual due to the kink.
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and Kleven and Waseem (2013), I define a measure of total excess bunching bˆ:
bˆ0 ≡
Bˆ0
hˆ(K)
=
Bˆ0∑K
j=zl
Cˆj/(K − zl + 1)
. (21)
The elasticity of earnings with respect to the net-of-tax rate can then be calcu-
lated by substituting
∆ztotal =
Bˆ0
hˆ(K)
into equation (3). The described calculations provide an
elasticity estimate eˆ0 based on the original guess e0. Provided the estimated
elasticity does not match the guess, i.e. eˆ0 6= e0, I update the guess to e1 = eˆ0
and repeat the calculations for the new guess. I proceed with these iterations
until a fixed point is achieved, such that eˆk = ek for some k.
A.3 Elasticity Heterogeneity
Elasticity formulas derived in (2) and (4) assume that elasticities are constant
across individuals. However, these formulae also apply to cases where elasticities
are heterogeneous. If the distribution of elasticities is independent from the
distribution of ability, (2) and (4) estimate average elasticity in the population. If,
on the other hand, the distribution is joint, (2) and (4) estimate average elasticity
of individuals at income level K. To see this, suppose ability and elasticities
are jointly distributed according to some distribution ψ(z, e). Then h(K) =∫
e
ψ(K, e)de. Define e¯K ≡
∫
e
eψ(K, e)de/h(K) to be the average elasticity at
earnings level K. Then from (4) follows that the number of individuals bunching
at K due to a kink of size t2− t1 is equal to Bkink =
∫
e
[(
1−t1
1−t2
)e
− 1
]
ψ(K, e)de ≈∫
e
e log
(
1−t1
1−t2
)
ψ(K, e)de = e¯Kh(K)K log
(
1−t1
1−t2
)
, where we use approximation
log(1 + r) = r with r =
(
1−t1
1−t2
)e
− 1. Note that the independence of ability
and elasticity distributions implies e¯K ≡
∫
e
eψ(K, e)de/h(K) =
∫
e
φ(e)de = e¯,
where φ(e) = ψ(z, e)/h(z). From (2) follows that bunching due to a notch ∆T is
equal to Bnotch =
∫
e
∆ztotal(e)ψ(K, e)de = h(K)E[∆ztotal]. Therefore, if there is
heterogeneity in the population, bunching measures average earnings response.
A.4 Counterfactual Fits Robustness Checks
The elasticity estimation procedure relies on several parameters: (a) the bin width
used to generate the observed distribution, (b) the degree of the polynomial that
is fit to the observed distribution, (c) the width of the estimation window, and (d)
the width of the bunching window. Of these parameters, (a) – (c) are chosen by
the researcher, while (d) is estimated visually. For empirical distributions in e25
bins, zl = 4 in 1999–2002, zl = 7 in 2003–2005, zl = 6 in 2006–2010 for women,
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and zl = 3 in 1999–2002, zl = 5 in 2003–2005, zl = 4 in 2006–2010 for men. For
empirical distributions in e12.5 bins, zl = 8 in 1999–2002, zl = 14 in 2003–2005,
zl = 12 in 2006–2010 for women, and zl = 6 in 1999–2002, zl = 10 in 2003–2005,
and zl = 8 in 2006–2010 for men. Parameter (c) – the width of the estimation
window – identifies which part of the observed distribution is used to estimate
the counterfactual distribution. A window that is too short will make estimation
of the counterfactual imprecise, while too large of a window can put too much
emphasis on the global, rather than local fit of the counterfactual. In this study,
the estimation window is bounded on the left by zero – since no individuals report
earning negative wages. I choose to limit the estimation window to the right by
e1750 for men and women, but the results are not sensitive to most choices of
estimation window.
In Table D.2 I show how elasticity estimates vary with (a) the bin width used
to generate the observed distribution and (b) the degree of polynomial fitted. For
convenience, specification (1) repeats the results from Table 2. Specification (1),
(2) and (4) show the amount of bunching b (recall definition (21)) and elasticity
e estimated using an empirical distribution of e25 bins, while specifications (3)
uses distribution of e12.5 bins.48 Specifications (1), (2) and (3) use a 7th degree
polynomial to construct counterfactual, while (4) uses a 6th degree polynomial.
Finally, specifications (1), (3) and (4) use the preferred definition of income (labor
plus social security minus 20% deductions), while specification (2) assumes that
individuals can only claim basic deductions “Werbungskosten” and “Sonderaus-
gabenpauschbetrag”. Overall Table D.2 confirms that the elasticity estimates are
robust across specifications, though some variation is present.
A.5 Income Tax Notch and Marginal Tax Rate Calculations
Let τMini denote the prevailing mini-job social security rate that employers must
pay on mini-job earnings, τFull determines the full social security tax rate that
is split equally between employers and employees, τIncome refers to the marginal
income tax rate and ∆TIncome to the lump-sum change in income tax liability
at the mini-job threshold K.49 Note that legally the threshold K applies to
posted earnings – wages paid to the workers by firms before income taxes and
the employee portion of social security taxes are withheld. However, because the
employer taxes differ below and above the threshold, I focus on changes in gross
48Note that the amount of bunching b is inversely proportional to the bin size, therefore
to compare bunching amounts, the result of specification (3) should be divided by 2 to be
comparable to the amount of bunching from specifications (2)–(4).
49I separate the income tax into a lump-sum and marginal tax rate portions because Germany
has continuously progressive marginal tax rates. Therefore income tax rate τIncome is not fixed.
Thus, ∆TIncome gives the true value of income tax due when posted income equals the mini-job
threshold K, while τIncome approximates the marginal tax rate at the threshold.
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earnings. The budget constraint (1) in terms of gross earnings prior to April 1,
2003 can be summarized as
T (Xg) =


τMini
1+τMini
·Xg if Xg ≤ K¯
∆Tincome +
(τFull+τIncome)K¯
1+0.5τFull
− (τMini+τIncome)K¯
1+τMini
+ τMini
1+τMini
· K¯ + τFull+τIncome
1+0.5τFull
(Xg − K¯) if Xg > K¯,
(22)
where K¯ ≡ (1 + τMini)K. Equation (22) shows that mini-jobs are exempt from
income and employee-paid social security taxes, while both types of taxes are due
upon crossing the mini-job threshold.50
After the 2003 reform, the tax schedule (1) becomes
T (Xg) =


τMini
1+τMini
·Xg if Xg ≤ K¯
∆TIncome +
(
1
1+0.5τFull
− 1
1+τMini
)
(2τFull − τMini + τIncome)K¯
+ τMini
1+τMini
K¯ + 2τFull−τMini+τIncome
1+0.5τFull
(Xg − K¯) if Xg > K¯,
(23)
where K¯ ≡ K(1+ τMini). Equation (23) shows a decrease in the size of the notch
at the mini-job threshold because the social security liability has been reduced.51
Equations (22) and (23) thus specify how marginal and average tax rates
change at the mini-job threshold. To calculate the average income tax notches
and marginal tax rates presented in Table 1 I use a 95% extract from the lon-
gitudinal version of the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), version 30.52 There are
a total of 592,864 non-duplicate year-person observations for years 1984 through
2013 with nonempty and nonzero household and personal weights covering 72,842
individuals (including children and elderly). I restrict my sample to individu-
als who reported posted wage earnings between [e300,e325] in 1996–2003 or
[e375,e400] in 2004–2013. I restrict my sample to workers in mini-jobs earning
50Since jobs with monthly posted earnings below the mini-job threshold are exempt from
income taxes and the employee portion of social security contributions, gross wages Xg below
the mini-job threshold are subject to a total tax T (Xg) = τMini ·Xp =
τMini
1+τMini
·Xg. Prior to
April 1, 2003, posted wagesXp above the mini-job threshold were subject to a total tax T (Xg) =
∆Tincome+τFullXp+τIncome ·(Xp−K) = ∆Tincome+τFull
Xg
1+0.5τFull
+τIncome
(
Xg
1+0.5τFull
−K
)
,
where ∆TIncome is the lump-sum amount of income tax a person must pay when earning
precisely K, and τIncome is the MTR at K.
51Starting from April 1, 2003, employees pay reduced social security rates when their earnings
exceed the mini-job threshold, but remain under e800. The total tax liability for posted wages
Xp is T (Xg) = [K
τMini
τFull
+ (2− τMini
τFull
)(Xp −K)] · τFull + τIncomeXp =
2τFull−τMini+τIncome
1+0.5τFull
Xg −
2K(τFull − τMini) + ∆TIncome − τIncomeK.
52In accordance with the German law only a 95% random sample can be provided to re-
searches from outside the European Union.
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in a narrow e25 bracket below or at the threshold for two reasons. First, we are
interested in estimating the tax notch and marginal tax rate at the threshold,
therefore the narrowest window should offer the most accurate estimates of tax
incentives. Second, despite the self-reported nature of the data, most individuals
report earning the threshold amount, closely resembling distributions observed in
the SIAB data. Third, increasing the size of the bracket to e50 or e75 decreases
the size of the estimated notch. Therefore elasticity calculations present a lower
bound on labor earnings elasticities with respect to net of social security and
income tax rates. To calculate the income tax notch, I first calculate the amount
of income tax the household must pay if the individuals remain in mini-jobs, i.e.
T (12 · Y spousei ). Second, I calculate the amount of income tax due should the
individual get a regular job that pays a salary equal to the mini-job threshold,
i.e. T (12 · (Y spousei + K)) and the corresponding marginal tax rate associated
with income 12 · (Y spousei +K). The income tax notch is then calculated as the
difference between the two tax amounts, T (12 · (Y spousei +K))− T (12 · Y
spouse
i ).
Ideally, one would want to observe the spousal income of all mini-jobbers in
every year and calculate tax notches and marginal tax rates accordingly. Un-
fortunately, such administrative data is not available. The SOEP data contains
spousal earnings but sample sizes are small, with only 170-350 observations per
year. To improve the quality and consistency of estimates across years I con-
sider three approaches to calculating income tax notches and MTRs. First, I
calculate the true average in year j by restricting the sample to mini-job workers
in year j only. Next, I expand the sample to also include mini-job workers in
recent years. Under the second approach, I calculate income tax notch based on
spousal incomes of individuals who held mini-jobs in 1999-2002 for years 1999
through 2002, 2003-2005 for years 2003 through 2005 and 2006-2010 for years
2006 through 2010 (preferred specification). The third approach mimics the sec-
ond approach but further expands the sample by including mini-job workers from
1999 through 2010. All three approaches use actual tax schedules in the target
year to calculate income tax rates.
I further consider four definitions of spousal income. The first, and simplest,
only includes spouse’s labor earnings, including those from self-employment. The
second definition includes social security pensions in addition to labor earnings:
old-age, disability, and widowhood. Note that prior to 2005, statutory pensions
were not subject to income tax. Starting from 2005, 50% of the pension is subject
to income tax, and this percentage share increases by 2% percentage points every
year. While the majority of pensioners in Germany rely on statutory pension
only, some individuals also receive income from private pensions. Thus, the
third definition of income further includes private pensions: supplementary civil
servant pension income, company pensions, private pensions and pension income
from “other” sources as reported in SOEP. Taxation of private pensions vary, but
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for simplicity I assume that the entire amount of pension is subject to income
tax. I also include household asset income: from interest, dividends, and rent.
Once again, taxation of financial income depends on income but for simplicity
the entire amount is assumed to be subject to income tax. Whenever any of the
additional income information is missing, it is set to zero, however, observations
with missing spousal labor income have been dropped. My preferred definition
of income is the second specification, that includes both labor and social security
income. I choose not to include financial earnings and private pensions since these
are not accurately reported in the survey data and thus are likely to introduce
more bias. Following Doerrenberg et al. (2017), I assume that individuals can
claim 20% of their earnings as deductions. As a robustness check, I also consider
a more conservative assumption that individuals only take advantage of the wage-
related expenses deduction (“Werbungskosten”) and other deductible expenses
deduction (“Sonderausgabenpauschbetrag”), see Table D.2.
Tables D.3 and D.4 compare notches and tax rates by definition of income,
relying on the 2nd sample approach (using 1999-2002, 2003-2005, 2006-2010 sam-
ples). As expected, the notch and marginal tax rate are smallest when only labor
earnings are included. The magnitude of the notch increases as pension and as-
set incomes are included. Nevertheless the differences are very small and have
negligible effect on the magnitude of elasticities. Note that the income definition
matters more for women than men, since spouses of women are more likely to
have various types of income.
Table D.5 compares income tax notches and marginal tax rates by sample
selections using the preferred definition of income (labor plus social security earn-
ings minus 20% deductions). The first column shows calculations of the “true
income” notches and tax rates. The results are very volatile across years. The
second column is based on spousal earnings of mini-job workers in corresponding
groups of years: 1999-2002, 2003-2005 and 2006-2010. Finally, the third column
includes all mini-job workers from years 1999-2010. Table D.5 show that the
estimated tax rates and notches are very similar across all three specifications
for both men and women, despite chosen samples. The estimates for men rely
on very small sample size. Perhaps for this reason, the estimates in the first two
samples appear to be very small in 2003-2005. For robustness, I use the “All
Years” estimates for these years in my elasticity calculations (see Table 1).
B Wage Differential Robustness Checks
A natural concern is whether the results in Table 3 are driven by outlier ob-
servations within the 1st to 99th percentiles of gross wages. Table D.9 presents
several robustness checks by repeating specifications (3), (4) and (9) of Table
3. In columns (1), (2) and (7) I consider a different definition of gross wage,
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which includes overtime hours and pay. Since overtime hours are paid at a higher
rate and are more likely to be reported for regular employees, we would expect
a smaller wage differential. This is precisely what we observe in columns (1), (2)
and (7) (which can be directly compared to columns (3), (4) and (9) of Table
3). The wage differential decreases by approximately 1 percentage point. Next, I
restrict the sample to individuals earning gross wages of more than e6 in columns
(3), (4) and (8). The results remain unchanged. Finally, I restrict the sample
to individuals earning a gross wage of more than e6 but less than e15 per hour
in columns (5), (6) and (9). The coefficients decrease slightly, by approximately
1 percentage point. In addition to results shown in Table D.9 I have verified
that the results are not sensitive to the earnings interval studied and inclusion of
higher order wage trends. Robustness checks confirm that the results in Table 3
are not driven by the definition of hours used or due to sample selection.
The quality of the household data is of substantial concern because so many
individuals report earning less than e5 per hour (especially among regular work-
ers) and more than e21. Therefore the large wage differential observed in Table
4 and Figure D.9 could be driven by outlier observations. As a robustness check,
I repeat specifications (3), (5), (8) and (9) from Table 4 in Table D.10 but re-
strict the interval of allowed gross wages. Requiring the gross wage to be at
least e3 does not have a strong effect on the estimates (see columns (1)-(2) and
(7)-(8)). Requiring wages to be at least e5 per hour removes the wage differen-
tial. This result is not surprising in light of Panel B of Figure D.9: more regular
workers report larger gross wages (e15 and more) than mini-job workers. Fi-
nally, restricting the sample to individuals earning between e5 and e15, makes
the coefficient statistically insignificant in columns (5) and (6) and marginally
significant in columns (11) and (12). The coefficients are positive but smaller
than in Table 4. The smaller magnitude of the coefficients is consistent with the
presence of a negative bias due to measurement errors and with our inability to
control for firm selection.53 These robustness checks suggest that while the mag-
nitude of the wage differential estimated using household data is inaccurate, the
wage differential between mini-job and regular jobs is positive and statistically
significant.
C Theoretical Model: Examples and Extensions
C.1 Multiple Equilibria Example
It is difficult to characterize the set of equilibria defined by equations (15)–(17)
without making assumptions on the functional form and distribution of individ-
53Recall that adding firm fixed effects increases the wage gap between mini-job and regular
gross wages.
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ual preferences. To illustrate the possibility of multiple equilibria, consider the
following example. Suppose the production function exhibits constant returns
to scale, then wages wˆ∗1 and wˆ
∗
2 are fixed and equal to the marginal product of
labor. Further, suppose all individuals are identical and the density of the ideal
distribution of hours F is given by: f(h∗) = 1 and f(h) = 0 whenever h 6= h∗.
If by exerting some effort σC(1/l¯), with C ′ > 0 and σ > 0, individuals can
narrow their search interval to [h∗ − l¯, h∗ + l¯] of the offered distribution G, then
Gˆ =
G· 1l∈(h∗−l¯,h∗+l¯)
G(h∗+l¯)−G(h∗−l¯)
. Because both effort σC(·) and the expected utility of a draw
from Gˆ decrease with l¯, individuals will choose an optimal l¯ that maximizes their
expected utility from job search process, i.e. l¯ = l¯(h∗, G). Moreover, dl¯/dσ > 0,
so that if σ = 0 then l¯ = 0, and if σ →∞ then l¯ =∞.
Now consider a probability density function g that satisfies: g(h∗ − hˆ) =
q1, g(h
∗) = q2, g(h
∗ + hˆ) = q3, and g(h) = 0 otherwise for some values hˆ. Then
any combination of (hˆ; q1, q2, q3) that satisfies the following condition at equilib-
rium prices wˆ∗1, wˆ
∗
2 is an equilibrium:
q1 + q2 + q3 = 1 : q1u(h
∗ − hˆ) + q2u(h
∗) + q3u(h
∗ + hˆ) > u(h∗)− σC(hˆ) (24)
where u(l) = u(c(l)l, l) given by (9). Condition (24) ensures that all individuals
choose not to pay the search cost and draw a job from the entire distribution at
random rather than pay the smallest necessary cost – σC(hˆ) – to make the interval
small enough so that only h = h∗ could be drawn. Condition (24) implies Gˆ = G
and therefore G satisfies (15)-(17). It is easy to see that there are numerous
combinations of (hˆ; q1, q2, q3) that satisfy condition (24) for most functions σC(·).
Further, higher values of cost shifter σ lead to a larger sets of equilibria. This
example can be further generalized to discrete or continuous distributions of ideal
hours F , asymmetric search intervals around h∗, etc.
C.2 Firm Frictions
Consider the following three-period model. In the first period the government
sets flat tax rates 1 − t1 =
1
1+φ1
= 1 − t2 =
1
1+φ2
. Firms and workers are
matched, resulting in an equilibrium distribution of hours G1 with corresponding
equilibrium wages (w11, w
1
2). Further, assume that a share of contracts θ expire in
the beginning of the second period, while 1 − θ cannot be changed until period
three. In the beginning of the second period the government announces a reform
that reduces the tax on type 1 workers by either setting t1 = 0 or by setting
φ1 = 0. Because in the third period all workers can renegotiate their contracts,
the final equilibrium distribution G3 satisfies conditions (15)–(17), and is identical
to the equilibrium of a one-period model with no firm frictions. The transitory
distribution of hours in the second period G2 = θG3 + (1 − θ)G1 is a sum of
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third-period distribution G3, for workers whose contracts expire in the beginning
of the second period, and distribution G1, for workers who are locked in until the
third period.
The model can be further extended to frameworks where firms can change
working hours of their employees in any period by paying a penalty π ∼ Fpi
with mean π¯. In this case there exists a critical value of penalty π∗, so that
all contracts with penalties π ≤ π∗ are cancelled in the beginning of period 2.
The speed of adjustment depends on how costly the penalties are: the lower the
average penalty π¯, the faster is the adjustment process. Note that if penalties
or durations of contracts are not randomly assigned across job types, then the
speed of adjustment will depend on the distribution of these restrictions across
contracts. Adjustment is faster if a larger fraction of type 1 workers is associated
with low levels of π or high value of θ.
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D Appendix Tables and Figures
Table D.1: Heterogeneity of Elasticities by Firm Size
1999-2002 2003-2005 2006-2010
e s.e.(e) e s.e.(e) e s.e.(e)
Women: All 0.09 (0.03) 0.13 (0.02) 0.14 (0.02)
≥ 5 employees 0.08 (0.02) 0.09 (0.01) 0.11 (0.01)
≥ 10 employees 0.06 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01) 0.09 (0.01)
≥ 20 employees 0.04 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.08 (0.01)
Men: All 0.09 (0.05) 0.28 (0.07) 0.33 (0.06)
≥ 5 employees 0.11 (0.05) 0.28 (0.08) 0.29 (0.05)
≥ 10 employees 0.11 (0.04) 0.21 (0.07) 0.25 (0.05)
≥ 20 employees 0.12 (0.03) 0.22 (0.06) 0.26 (0.05)
Notes : This table shows elasticities of earnings with respect to net-of-tax rate by firm size. The results show that responses are stronger
at firms with fewer employees, but differences are not very large. Source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975
- 2010, Nuremberg 2013.
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Table D.2: Elasticity Estimates Robustness Check
Year (1) Baseline (2) Basic Deductions (3) Bins e12.5 (4) Degree 6
b s.e.(b) e s.e.(e) b s.e.(b) e s.e.(e) b s.e.(b) e s.e.(e) b s.e.(b) e s.e.(e)
Women:
1999 14.35 0.98 0.08 0.02 14.35 1.06 0.07 0.02 23.69 1.10 0.02 0.02 12.66 0.92 0.04 0.02
2000 15.08 1.68 0.11 0.04 15.08 1.67 0.09 0.04 27.04 1.74 0.07 0.02 14.17 1.80 0.09 0.03
2001 16.48 1.82 0.16 0.04 16.48 1.81 0.15 0.04 27.64 1.52 0.10 0.02 14.25 0.84 0.11 0.02
2002 14.59 1.16 0.12 0.03 14.59 1.17 0.10 0.03 28.67 1.64 0.11 0.02 13.80 0.79 0.10 0.02
2003 12.67 1.06 0.08 0.02 12.67 1.06 0.07 0.02 23.90 1.36 0.07 0.01 12.89 0.84 0.09 0.02
2004 15.16 1.80 0.15 0.03 15.16 1.81 0.13 0.03 24.33 1.45 0.09 0.02 15.36 1.13 0.15 0.02
2005 14.28 1.24 0.14 0.02 14.28 1.25 0.12 0.02 23.68 1.11 0.09 0.01 15.69 0.87 0.17 0.02
2006 14.29 1.36 0.14 0.02 14.29 1.36 0.12 0.02 25.78 1.39 0.11 0.02 14.32 0.59 0.14 0.01
2007 14.24 1.05 0.14 0.02 14.24 1.05 0.12 0.02 30.88 1.53 0.16 0.02 14.50 1.66 0.14 0.02
2008 13.78 1.87 0.13 0.05 13.78 1.87 0.11 0.04 27.98 4.55 0.13 0.02 14.97 0.70 0.15 0.02
2009 16.18 2.49 0.18 0.03 16.18 2.49 0.16 0.03 30.01 2.04 0.16 0.02 15.75 2.91 0.17 0.05
2010 15.31 1.29 0.17 0.02 15.31 1.29 0.15 0.02 29.89 1.29 0.16 0.02 19.21 4.00 0.26 0.07
Men:
1999 8.36 1.89 0.07 0.04 8.36 1.54 0.06 0.05 16.05 2.40 0.06 0.03 8.11 0.94 0.06 0.03
2000 8.81 1.53 0.09 0.05 8.81 1.53 0.08 0.05 16.14 2.15 0.07 0.04 7.29 1.17 0.04 0.03
2001 8.83 2.01 0.11 0.07 8.83 1.77 0.10 0.06 16.05 2.94 0.08 0.05 7.51 1.74 0.06 0.05
2002 8.58 1.79 0.10 0.06 8.58 1.79 0.09 0.06 18.35 2.30 0.12 0.04 7.30 1.16 0.05 0.04
2003 12.69 2.65 0.32 0.09 12.69 2.46 0.29 0.08 20.73 3.28 0.24 0.06 9.08 1.27 0.20 0.04
2004 11.28 2.48 0.30 0.09 11.28 2.89 0.27 0.10 30.02 5.07 0.44 0.09 7.59 1.43 0.16 0.05
2005 9.07 1.50 0.22 0.06 9.07 1.66 0.20 0.06 19.93 2.90 0.26 0.05 8.39 1.02 0.20 0.04
2006 8.10 1.23 0.17 0.05 8.10 1.07 0.15 0.04 14.95 1.71 0.14 0.03 9.15 0.97 0.21 0.04
2007 10.65 1.35 0.27 0.06 10.65 1.49 0.24 0.06 16.77 2.31 0.18 0.05 10.55 0.91 0.27 0.04
2008 10.84 3.50 0.28 0.14 10.84 3.13 0.25 0.12 24.30 3.02 0.33 0.06 14.45 2.06 0.43 0.09
2009 12.51 2.17 0.37 0.10 12.51 2.15 0.32 0.09 17.55 2.51 0.20 0.05 12.30 1.55 0.36 0.07
2010 11.99 2.13 0.34 0.09 11.99 1.54 0.31 0.06 21.32 2.88 0.28 0.06 10.61 2.36 0.28 0.10
Notes : Excess bunching and elasticities are estimated using the procedure outlined in Section 2.1. In specification (1) and (2) I fit 7th
degree polynomial to an empirical distribution of gross earnings of e25 bins. In specifications (3) I fit a 7th degree polynomial to an
empirical distribution of gross earnings of e12.5 bins. In specification (4) I fit a 6th degree polynomial to a distribution of e25 bins.
Bootstrap standard errors are based on 100 iterations. Source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975 - 2010,
Nuremberg 2013.
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Table D.3: Income Tax Notches and MTRs. Women: Comparison of Income Definitions
Deductions: 20% of Gross Income Deductions: Basic
Labor Only Labor + SS Labor + SS Labor + SS
Pensions + Assets
Notch MTR Notch MTR Notch MTR Notch MTR Notch MTR
by year: 1999 80 24 80 25 81 25 83 25
2000 76 23 76 24 77 24 81 25
2001 71 21 71 22 72 22 75 23
2002 71 21 71 22 72 22 75 23
2003 87 21 87 22 90 23 92 23
2004 82 20 82 21 84 22 88 22
2005 80 20 80 20 83 21 86 22
2006 88 22 88 24 90 24 94 25
2007 88 22 88 24 90 24 94 25
2008 88 22 88 24 90 24 94 25
2009 87 22 87 24 88 24 94 25
2010 86 21 86 24 88 24 92 25
1998-2002: under 25 35 10 35 12 34 11 35 12
25–40 years old 78 24 78 24 79 24 78 24
40–60 years old 67 20 67 22 68 22 67 22
over 60 37 11 37 12 38 12 37 12
2003-2011: under 25 32 8 32 10 30 9 30 9
25–40 years old 87 21 87 22 90 22 90 22
40–60 years old 75 19 75 20 78 21 78 21
over 60 30 8 31 8 32 8 32 8
Notes : This table shows the average income tax notch and marginal tax rates experienced by women at the mini-job threshold. Notch
is the average lump-sum payment of income tax an individual must make upon exceeding the mini-job threshold. MTR is the average
marginal tax rate at the mini-job threshold. For single individuals, spousal income is set to zero. For further details see Appendix A.5.
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), version 30.
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Table D.4: Income Tax Notches and MTRs. Men: Comparison of Income Definitions
Deductions: 20% of Gross Income Deductions: Basic
Labor Only Labor + SS Labor + SS Labor + SS
Pensions + Assets
Notch MTR Notch MTR Notch MTR Notch MTR Notch MTR
by year: 1999 31 10 31 11 31 11 34 11
2000 29 10 29 11 29 10 32 11
2001 25 9 25 10 24 9 28 10
2002 25 9 25 10 24 9 28 10
2003 13 4 13 4 12 4 15 5
2004 11 3 11 3 9 3 13 4
2005 10 3 10 3 9 3 12 3
2006 34 10 34 11 33 11 39 12
2007 34 10 34 11 33 11 39 12
2008 34 10 34 11 33 11 39 12
2009 33 9 33 10 32 10 38 12
2010 34 9 34 10 33 10 36 12
1998-2002: under 25 4 1 4 1 5 1 4 1
25–40 years old 27 10 27 10 27 10 27 10
40–60 years old 26 9 26 10 24 10 26 10
over 60 13 5 13 5 16 6 13 5
2003-2011: under 25 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
25–40 years old 11 3 11 3 9 3 11 3
40–60 years old 13 4 13 4 12 3 13 4
over 60 15 4 15 4 14 4 15 4
Notes : This table shows the average income tax notch and marginal tax rates experienced by men at the mini-job threshold. Notch is the
average lump-sum payment of income tax an individual must make upon exceeding the mini-job threshold. MTR is the average marginal
tax rate at the mini-job threshold. For single individuals, spousal income is set to zero. For further details see Appendix A.5. Source:
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), version 30.
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Table D.5: Income Tax Notches and MTRs. Comparison of Sample Selections
Women:
True Average 1999-02, 2003-05, 2006-10 All Years
Notch MTR N Income Notch MTR N Income Notch MTR N Income
1999 83 27 119 2260 80 25 892 2274 81 26 2322 2494
2000 74 23 254 2161 76 24 892 2274 78 25 2322 2494
2001 72 22 259 2294 71 22 892 2274 73 24 2322 2494
2002 70 21 260 2355 71 22 892 2274 73 23 2322 2494
2003 82 21 207 2334 87 22 562 2497 90 24 2322 2494
2004 83 21 174 2511 82 21 562 2497 85 23 2322 2494
2005 85 22 181 2708 80 20 562 2497 83 22 2322 2494
2006 86 22 193 2660 88 24 868 2722 83 22 2322 2494
2007 86 25 188 2660 88 24 868 2722 83 22 2322 2494
2008 86 24 177 2632 88 24 868 2722 83 22 2322 2494
2009 92 25 167 2904 87 24 868 2722 82 22 2322 2494
2010 87 23 143 2761 86 24 868 2722 80 22 2322 2494
Men:
True Average 1999-02, 2003-05, 2006-10 All Years
Notch MTR N Income Notch MTR N Income Notch MTR N Income
1999 12 4 10 276 31 11 49 778 32 12 133 836
2000 20 8 14 567 29 11 49 778 30 11 133 836
2001 50 17 14 1532 25 10 49 778 25 10 133 836
2002 24 11 11 713 25 10 49 778 25 10 133 836
2003 32 9 8 773 13 4 25 326 32 10 133 836
2004 10 4 7 309 11 3 25 326 28 9 133 836
2005 0 0 10 71 10 3 25 326 27 9 133 836
2006 35 11 13 1093 34 11 59 1036 27 9 133 836
2007 47 19 11 1418 34 11 59 1036 27 9 133 836
2008 39 10 12 1108 34 11 59 1036 27 9 133 836
2009 27 8 12 874 33 10 59 1036 26 9 133 836
2010 27 7 11 914 34 10 59 1036 26 8 133 836
Notes : This table shows the average income tax notch and marginal tax rates experienced by
women, age 31 through 54 inclusive, at the mini-job threshold. Notch is the average lump-sum
payment of income tax an individual must make upon exceeding the mini-job threshold. MTR
is the average marginal tax rate at the mini-job threshold. N is the number of observations
used to calculate the average marginal tax rate, income notch and average spousal income.
Income is the average income of a spouse of a mini-job worker earning [eK-25,eK] per month,
where K denotes the mini-job threshold. For single individuals, spousal income is set to zero.
Spousal income includes labor earnings as well as social security payments. For further details
see Appendix A.5. Source: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), version 30.
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Table D.6: Summary Statistics (Firm Survey VSE)
Income: [e50,e375] Income: [e375; e400] Income: [e400, e500] Income: [e500, e1000] Income: [e1000, e1500]
N=210,273 N=86,157 N=21,082 N=186,503 N=379,117
mean sd p50 mean sd p50 mean sd p50 mean sd p50 mean sd p50
Male 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.17 0.37 0.00 0.27 0.44 0.00
Age: 26-40 year old 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.32 0.47 0.00
Age: 40-60 year old 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.54 0.50 1.00 0.54 0.50 1.00
Age: 60-65 year old 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.04 0.18 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.00
Age: > 60 year old 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00
No HS, No Voc. Tr.a 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.18 0.39 0.00 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.16 0.37 0.00
No HS + Voc. Tr. 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.58 0.49 1.00
HS, No Voc. Tr. 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.00
HS + Voc. Tr. 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.00
Fachhochschule 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.00
College/University 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.00
Educ. Unknown 0.51 0.50 1.00 0.52 0.50 1.00 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.19 0.39 0.00
Company Tenureb 47.04 67.17 24.00 44.03 58.51 25.00 73.33 98.51 37.00 94.69 107.04 57.00 105.35 110.33 66.00
Salaried Employees 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.00
Homeworkers 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
Part-time <18 h/w 1.00 0.04 1.00 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.88 0.33 1.00 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.05 0.23 0.00
Part-time ≥18 h/w 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.54 0.50 1.00 0.52 0.50 1.00
Skilled Hourly Employee 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.11 0.32 0.00
Civil Servants 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.00
Monthly Hours 33.25 14.14 33.00 48.11 12.15 47.00 53.38 18.71 51.50 90.49 34.44 86.60 128.17 37.34 130.35
Posted Hourly Wage 7.94 2.53 7.84 8.76 2.50 8.37 9.37 3.16 8.72 9.84 3.45 9.21 10.80 3.47 9.65
Gross Hourly Wage 10.29 3.28 10.17 11.34 3.24 10.84 11.50 3.93 10.76 11.85 4.16 11.10 13.00 4.17 11.61
Net Hourly Wage 7.88 2.57 7.72 8.66 2.51 8.26 7.97 2.96 7.54 7.50 2.70 6.95 7.73 2.42 6.96
Yearly Bonus 34.29 124.55 0.00 20.00 115.08 0.00 156.85 328.63 0.00 441.67 574.39 230.00 763.81 877.49 591.00
Vacation Daysc 7.09 8.47 4.00 8.03 8.50 6.00 13.13 12.49 10.00 18.78 10.68 16.00 21.86 7.29 23.00
Subcompanyd 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.47 0.50 0.00
Handcraft Business 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.04 0.21 0.00
N. of Male Empl.e 289.13 1714.66 26.00 68.11 396.71 21.00 225.63 1652.06 22.00 414.39 3036.00 22.00 575.93 3679.26 29.00
N. of Female Empl.e 334.27 1416.63 41.00 97.47 552.98 26.00 604.52 2804.48 42.00 929.78 4260.35 51.00 1402.95 5637.35 46.00
Notes : This tables shows summary statistics (mean, standard deviation and median) for the combined 2006 and 2010 waves of the VSE
Survey. The following categories have been omitted: 25 year old or younger, unskilled salaried workers. a HS stands for High School, Voc.
Tr. stands for Vocational Training. b Company tenure is measured in months. c Vacation days represent the full-time equivalent number
of vacation days per year based on a 5-day working week. d Subcompany refers to establishments that are part of larger firms. e Number
of male and female employees at the establishment of the employee, rather than the larger firm. Source: FDZ der Statistischen A¨mter des
Bundes und der La¨nder, Verdienststrukturerhebung, 2006 and 2010, author’s calculations.
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Table D.7: Summary Statistics (Household SOEP)
Income: [e50,e375] Income: [e375; e400] Income: [e400, e500] Income: [e500, e1000] Income: [e1000, e1500]
N=11,404 N=2,965 N=2,509 N=20,622 N=34,114
mean sd p50 mean sd p50 mean sd p50 mean sd p50 mean sd p50
Male 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.18 0.39 0.00 0.17 0.37 0.00 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.38 0.48 0.00
Age: 26-40 year old 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.39 0.49 0.00
Age: 40-60 year old 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.40 0.49 0.00
Age: 60-65 year old 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.00
Age: > 65 year old 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00
Married 0.66 0.47 1.00 0.72 0.45 1.00 0.65 0.48 1.00 0.64 0.48 1.00 0.55 0.50 1.00
Partner (Not married) 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.05 0.23 0.00 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.11 0.31 0.00
No HSa 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.00
HS, No Voc. Tr. 0.17 0.37 0.00 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.15 0.35 0.00 0.12 0.33 0.00
HS + Voc. Tr. 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.35 0.48 0.00
Further Voc. Tr 0.38 1.11 0.00 0.42 1.14 0.00 0.38 1.07 0.00 0.40 1.03 0.00 0.41 1.00 0.00
Fachhochschule 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.00
College/University 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.06 0.24 0.00
Company Tenureb 68.33 88.24 33.60 69.29 86.94 36.00 83.99 91.85 48.00 85.65 95.91 48.00 99.74 100.81 64.80
Monthly Hours 57.85 38.38 43.33 70.17 37.13 65.00 95.09 48.44 86.67 124.29 44.35 117.00 155.02 34.36 173.33
Posted Hourly Wage 5.79 3.44 5.21 7.15 3.62 6.15 6.37 3.95 5.31 7.22 3.43 6.29 8.76 3.02 7.90
Gross Hourly Wage 7.14 4.30 6.40 9.14 4.64 8.00 7.62 4.75 6.29 8.63 4.13 7.51 10.46 3.65 9.38
Net Hourly Wage 5.37 3.27 4.88 6.53 3.30 6.15 4.72 2.96 3.85 4.93 2.34 4.38 5.85 1.99 5.39
Yearly Bonus 71.51 265.25 0.00 78.57 383.66 0.00 181.27 388.16 0.00 381.54 486.06 204.00 796.77 722.54 716.00
Full Time Experience 8.62 10.49 5.00 8.34 10.15 5.00 8.12 9.46 5.00 9.76 9.94 6.70 12.56 10.91 9.00
Part Time Experience 6.06 6.78 3.60 7.31 7.13 5.10 7.22 8.20 4.20 5.50 7.15 2.50 3.13 5.87 0.00
Training Matching 0.29 0.46 0.00 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.52 0.50 1.00
Firm Size: <20 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.51 0.50 1.00 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.26 0.44 0.00
Firm Size: 20-200 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.31 0.46 0.00
Firm Size: 200-2000 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.15 0.35 0.00 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.21 0.41 0.00
Firm Size: >2000 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.18 0.39 0.00
Notes : This tables shows summary statistics (mean, standard deviation and median) for the combined 2004–2011 waves of the Socioeco-
nomic Panel (SOEP). The following category has been omitted: 25 year old or younger. a HS stands for High School, Voc. Tr. stands for
Vocational Training. b Company tenure is measured in months. Source: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), version 30.
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Table D.8: The Effect of Mini-Job Status on Gross Wage (Firm Survey VSE)
Monthly Income e375–e500 Monthly Income e50–e1500
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Gross Wage)
Mini-Job 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.066*** 0.075*** 0.061***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Mini-Job x Male 0.001*** 0.016***
(0.006) (0.003)
Mini-Job x Age<25 -0.011 -0.002
(0.009) (0.004)
Mini-Job x Age 40-60 0.007 -0.012***
(0.006) (0.002)
Mini-Job x Age 60-65 -0.011 0.011***
(0.013) (0.004)
Mini-Job x Age >65 0.002 -0.003
(0.013) (0.006)
Mini-Job x Industry Coll. Agr. 0.008 0.034***
(0.010) (0.005)
Mini-Job x Firm Coll. Agr. -0.023 0.016
(0.026) (0.016)
Mini-Job x Enterprise Coll. Agr. -0.101*** -0.056***
(0.030) (0.014)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Wage Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic Wage Trend No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 107,239 107,239 107,239 887,183 887,183 887,183
Notes : This table shows the coefficients from regressing the logarithm of gross wage on a mini-job indicator interacted with gender (columns
1 and 4), age (columns 2 and 5), collective agreements (columns 3 and 6). Standard errors are clustered by firm. Individual controls include
male indicator, age group indicators, company tenure, education indicators, occupational status and occupation indicators. Linear and
quadratic trends include both linear/quadratic terms and their interactions with the mini-job indicator. Source: FDZ der Statistischen
A¨mter des Bundes und der La¨nder, Verdienststrukturerhebung, 2006 and 2010, author’s calculations.
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Table D.9: Robustness Checks (Firms Survey VSE)
Monthly Income e375–e500 Monthly Income e50–e1500
Incl. Overtime Wage > e6 Wage ∈ (e6,e15] Incl. Overtime Wage > e6 Wage ∈ (e6,e15]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Gross Wage)
Mini-Job 0.0485*** 0.080*** 0.057*** 0.085*** 0.052*** 0.074*** 0.057*** 0.042*** 0.055***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Wage Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic Wage Trend No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 107,239 107,239 105,637 105,637 93,760 93,760 887,183 862,420 674,859
Notes : This table shows the coefficients from regressing the logarithm of gross wage on a mini-job indicator variable. Standard errors are
clustered by firm. In columns (1), (2) and (7), gross wage is calculated as all monthly income (including overtime pay) divided by total
hours worked (including overtime). In columns (3), (4) and (8), the sample is restricted to individuals with gross wages of more than e6
per hour. In columns (5), (6) and (9), the sample is restricted to individuals with gross wages of more than e6 per hour but less than e15
per hour. Individual controls include male indicator, age group indicators, company tenure, education indicators, occupational status and
occupation indicators. Linear and quadratic trends include both linear/quadratic terms and their interactions with the mini-job indicator.
Source: FDZ der Statistischen A¨mter des Bundes und der La¨nder, Verdienststrukturerhebung, 2006 and 2010, author’s calculations.
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Table D.10: Robustness Checks (Household Survey SOEP)
Monthly Income e375–e500 Monthly Income e50–e1500
Wage > e3 Wage > e5 Wage ∈ (e5,e15] Wage> e3 Wage > e5 Wage ∈ (e5,e15]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent Variable: Log(Hourly Gross Wage)
Mini-Job 0.084** 0.067** -0.017 -0.025 0.027 0.022 0.106*** 0.102*** -0.002 0.003 0.038* 0.039**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.029) (0.031) (0.023) (0.023) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020)
Indiv. Notch -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indiv. Controls (subset) Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Indiv. Controls (full) No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Wage Trend No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic Wage Trend No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 3,264 2,934 2,933 2,648 2,662 2,417 20,007 18,436 18,893 17,455 15,857 14,695
Notes : This table shows the coefficients from regressing the logarithm of gross wage on a mini-job indicator. Standard errors are clustered
by individual. In columns (1), (2) and (7), the sample is restricted to individuals with gross wages of more than e3 per hour. In columns
(3), (4) and (8), the sample is restricted to individuals with gross wages of more than e5 per hour. In columns (5), (6) and (9), the sample
is restricted to individuals with gross wages of more than e5 per hour but less than e15 per hour. Individual controls (subset) include male
indicator, age group indicators, company tenure, education indicators and occupation indicators. In addition to above controls, the full
set also includes marital status, presence of a partner (if not married), citizenship indicator, indicator of whether a job matches completed
training, experience working full time and experience working part time. Firm controls include industry indicators and indicators of size
(by number of employees). Linear and quadratic trends include both linear/quadratic terms and their interactions with the mini-job
indicator. Source: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), version 30.
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Figure D.1: Budget Constraints Around the Mini-Job Threshold (in Gross Wages)
Panel A: 1999-2002 Panel B: 2003-2005 Panel C: 2006-2010
400 Gross Earnings z
Consumption
z-T(z)
Kink: ∆MTR = 17% +τˆincome
Notch: e67+ ∆Tˆincome
500 Gross Earnings z
Consumption
z-T(z)
Kink: ∆MTR = 29% +τˆincome
Notch: e6+ ∆Tˆincome
525 Gross Earnings z
Consumption
z-T(z)
Kink: ∆MTR = 17% +τˆincome
Notch: e17+ ∆Tˆincome
Notes : This figure shows budget constraints experiences by individuals in 1999-2002, 2003-2005 and 2006-2010 in terms of gross earnings.
Gross earnings are defined as wages paid inclusive of all income and employee-paid social security taxes plus social security taxes paid
by the employer. The budget constraints show the magnitude of the social security notch and the magnitude of change in social security
tax rate (absolute difference). In addition to higher social security taxes, individuals must pay income taxes. The magnitude of income
tax due, τˆincome and ∆Tˆincome, depends on individual’s marital status and spousal earnings. For single individuals, τˆincome = 0 and
∆Tˆincome = 0. For married individuals, τˆincome =
τIncome
1+0.5τFull
and ∆Tˆincome = ∆T + τincomeK¯
(
1
1+0.5τFull
− 1
1+τMini
)
, where τMini, τFull,
and average τIncome and ∆TIncome are available in Table 1. For further details see Section 2.2.
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Figure D.2: Earnings: Women by Age Group
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Notes : This figure shows the distribution of monthly wage earnings (posted) of women by age group in 1999-2002, 2003-2005 and 2006-
2010. Each point shows the number of individuals in a e25 bin divided by the total number of females in that year group. The vertical red
lines identify the mini-job thresholds: e325 prior to 2003 and e400 thereafter. Source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies
(SIAB) 1975 - 2010, Nuremberg 2013.
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Figure D.3: Earnings: Men by Age Group
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Notes : This figure shows the distribution of monthly wage earnings (posted) of men by age group in 1999-2002, 2003-2005 and 2006-2010.
Each point shows the number of individuals in a e25 bin divided by the total number of males in that year group. The vertical red
lines identify the mini-job thresholds: e325 prior to 2003 and e400 thereafter. Source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies
(SIAB) 1975 - 2010, Nuremberg 2013.
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Figure D.4: Counterfactual Fits: Women
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Notes : Excess bunching and elasticities are estimated using the procedure outlined in Section 3. I fit 7th degree polynomial to empirical
distribution of gross earnings, by e25 bins. Lower exclusion region zl is determined visually: for women zl = 4 in 1999–2002, zl = 7 in
2003–2006, zl = 6 in 2007–2010. Estimation procedure starts with an initial guess of elasticity e0 = 0.01 and iterates until a fixed point is
reached. Bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 iterations. Solid red line marks the mini-job threshold and dashed red lines identify
the exclusion region [zl, zu]. Source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975 - 2010, Nuremberg 2013.
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Figure D.5: Counterfactual Fits: Men
Excess mass b=8.36***
(1.8851) 
Elasticity e = 0.07***
(0.0425) 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000
monthly pay (in euros)
1999
Excess mass b=8.81***
(1.5331) 
Elasticity e = 0.09***
(0.0532) 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000
monthly pay (in euros)
2000
Excess mass b=8.83***
(2.0066) 
Elasticity e = 0.11***
(0.0677) 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000
monthly pay (in euros)
2001
Excess mass b=8.57***
(1.7914) 
Elasticity e = 0.10***
(0.0589) 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000
monthly pay (in euros)
2002
Excess mass b=12.69***
(2.6486) 
Elasticity e = 0.32***
(0.0892) 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000
monthly pay (in euros)
2003
Excess mass b=11.28***
(2.4759) 
Elasticity e = 0.30***
(0.0915) 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000
monthly pay (in euros)
2004
Excess mass b=9.07***
(1.4985) 
Elasticity e = 0.22***
(0.0565) 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000
monthly pay (in euros)
2005
Excess mass b=8.10***
(1.2302) 
Elasticity e = 0.17***
(0.0495) 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000
monthly pay (in euros)
2006
Excess mass b=10.65***
(1.3475) 
Elasticity e = 0.27***
(0.0563) 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000
monthly pay (in euros)
2007
Excess mass b=10.84***
(3.4965) 
Elasticity e = 0.28***
(0.1447) 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000
monthly pay (in euros)
2008
Excess mass b=12.51***
(2.1711) 
Elasticity e = 0.37***
(0.0955) 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000
monthly pay (in euros)
2009
Excess mass b=11.99***
(2.1320) 
Elasticity e = 0.34***
(0.0937) 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000
monthly pay (in euros)
2010
Notes : Excess bunching and elasticities are estimated using the procedure outlined in Section 3. I fit 7th degree polynomial to empirical
distribution of gross earnings, by e25 bins. Lower exclusion region zl is determined visually: for men, zl = 3 in 1999–2002, zl = 5 in
2003–2005, zl = 4 in 2006–2010. Estimation procedure starts with an initial guess of elasticity e0 = 0.01 and iterates until a fixed point is
reached. Bootstrap standard errors are based on 1000 iterations. Solid red line marks the mini-job threshold and dashed red lines identify
the exclusion region [zl, zu]. Source: Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975 - 2010, Nuremberg 2013.
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Figure D.6: Behavioral Responses to the First Income Tax Kink in 1998 and 2001
Excess mass b = 0.46***
(.0358)  
Elasticity e = 0.07***
(0.0057)  
0
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
yearly taxable income (in euros)
First Income Tax Bracket: Singles, 1998
Excess mass b = 1.04***
(.1209)  
Elasticity e = 0.08***
(0.0094)  
0
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
yearly taxable income (in euros)
First Income Tax Bracket: Married, 1998
Excess mass b = 0.21***
(.0667)  
Elasticity e = 0.04***
(0.0125)  
0
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
yearly taxable income (in euros)
First Income Tax Bracket: Singles, 2001
Excess mass b = 0.69***
(.1125)  
Elasticity e = 0.06***
(0.0125)  
0
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
yearly taxable income (in euros)
First Income Tax Bracket: Married, 2001
Notes : These figures show the distribution of posted earnings in 1998 and 2001 for single and married individuals around the start of
first income tax bracket. In 1998, the marginal income tax rate increased from zero to 25.9% at e6,322 for single and at e12,644 for
married individuals. In 2001, the marginal income tax rate increased from zero to 19.9% at e7,206 for single and at e14,412 for married
individuals. Source: FDZ der Statistischen A¨mter des Bundes und der La¨nder, Lohn- und Einkommensteuerstatistik Public-Use-Files,
1998 and 2001, author’s calculations.
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Figure D.7: Earnings Distributions in 2002, 2003 and 2004
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Notes : These figures show the overlapping distributions of posted earnings in 2002, 2003 and 2004 for women. Source: Sample of Integrated
Labour Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975 - 2010, Nuremberg 2013.
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Figure D.8: Hourly Gross Wage by Income: Subsample (Firm Survey VSE)
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Notes : This figure shows the mean, as well as the 25th and 75th percentiles of hourly gross wage by e25 bins of monthly pay in
2006 and 2010. The sample is restricted to mini-job workers with monthly posted earnings below the mini-job threshold and regular
workers with monthly posted earnings above the mini-job threshold. Source: FDZ der Statistischen A¨mter des Bundes und der La¨nder,
Verdienststrukturerhebung, 2006 and 2010, author’s calculations.
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Figure D.9: Earnings Distributions, Weekly Hours and Wages by Income (Household Survey SOEP)
Panel A: Weekly Hours by Monthly
Income
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Panel C: Posted Wages by Monthly
Income
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Panel D: Net Wages by Monthly In-
come
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Panel E: Yearly Bonus by Monthly
Income
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Notes : Panel A shows the mean, as well as the 25th and 75th percentiles of weekly hours by e25 bins of monthly pay. Panel B, C and D
show the mean, as well as the 25th and 75th percentiles of hourly gross, posted and net wages by e25 bins of monthly pay. Panel E and
F shows the mean, as well as the 25th and 75th percentiles of yearly bonus and the number of full-time equivalent vacation days by e25
bins of monthly pay. Source: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), version 30, author’s calculations.
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Figure D.10: Hour and Wage Distributions in 2006 and 2010
Panel A: Hour Distributions below/above the Threshold
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Panel B: Gross Wage Distributions below/above the Threshold
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Notes : Panel A shows the distribution of weekly hours for mini-job workers and regular workers earning between e375 and e500 per month
(posted earnings). Panel B shows the distribution of hourly gross wage for mini-job workers and regular workers earning between e375
and e500 per month (posted earnings). Source: FDZ der Statistischen A¨mter des Bundes und der La¨nder, Verdienststrukturerhebung,
2006 and 2010, author’s calculations.
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